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Abstract 
The European electricity market is in the middle of a transformation from monopolistic 
state-owned production and distribution to privatised markets, with various competing 
firms. The speed of privatisation differs widely across Europe from full trade of electric-
ity at the wholesale market in Scandinavian countries, to partial trade on the wholesale 
market in The Netherlands and Germany, and no trade on the wholesale market in 
France and Belgium. Hence, the market and its rules are no longer fixed, and the  
electricity market is in the middle of a dynamic and complex process of change. 
This report discusses whether the liberalisation process can result in more efficient elec-
tricity production in Europe. In addition, the environmental impacts of the liberalisation 
process are studied. Efficiency of electricity production is analysed with a static compu-
tational game theoretic model, which compares strategic options of and interactions 
among energy suppliers. This model is calibrated to the European electricity market in 
eight countries, namely Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, 
Norway, and Sweden.  
In a liberalised market, large firms are most likely to behave strategically and exercise 
market power in order to maximise profits. As a result, wholesale prices might increase, 
partially or fully off-setting the purpose of liberalisation, namely to decrease wholesale 
prices. Also, a potential market leader may emerge, who by anticipating on the reaction 
of followers, could acquire higher profits by increasing production and market share. Fi-
nally, firms can also acquire passive ownership in other firms. Passive cross-border 
ownership can increase a firm’s market power and profits, resulting in even higher 
wholesale prices. 
The environmental impacts of different scenarios of producer behaviour are ambiguous. 
Under full competition, greenhouse gas emissions decline compared to the initial situa-
tion, while acidification and smog formation increase. In the case where large firms act 
strategically, the levels of emission decrease due to higher electricity prices and lower 
levels of electricity demand. In the case with a potential first-moving market leader, the 
levels of emission increase substantially. This result, however, depends on the  
technology mix of the electricity capacity of the market leader.  
 

Electricity market liberalisation in Europe  1
1. Introduction 
Following EU Electricity Directive 96/92/EC, liberalisation of the European electricity 
market is going to be realised by all EU countries by 2007 (Schils, 2003). The European 
electricity market is in the middle of a transformation from monopolistic state-owned 
production and distribution to privatised markets, with various competing firms. The 
speed of privatisation differs widely across Europe from full trade of electricity at the 
wholesale market in Scandinavian countries, to partial trade on the wholesale market in 
the Netherlands and Germany, and no trade on the wholesale market in France and Bel-
gium. Hence, the market and its rules are no longer fixed, and the electricity market is in 
the middle of a dynamic and complex process of changes.  
In order to get insight into the possible economic and environmental impacts of the lib-
eralisation process of the electricity market, the EU has commissioned the EMELIE1 
(Electricity MarkEt Liberalization In Europe) project. Within the EMELIE project, sci-
entific researchers and representatives of electricity producers collaborated. The partici-
pants of the EMELIE project originated mainly from northwestern Europe. The EMELIE 
project focussed attention on the electricity markets of 8 countries, namely Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, which we 
refer to as EU8.  
Figure 1.1 shows the shares in electricity capacity and demand for electricity of the EU8 
countries in the year 2000. In 2000, the total electricity capacity in these eight countries 
amounted to 259 GW, while the total demand for electricity amounted to 1,423 TWh. 
France has the largest share of electricity capacity with 35%, and Germany has the larg-
est share of demand for electricity with 34%. Denmark is the smallest country with a 
share of 4% of the electricity capacity and with a share of 2% of total demand.  
The process of liberalisation may have serious consequences for the market structure of 
the European electricity market. From the economic theory of industrial organisation 
(Tirole, 1988), we know that there is a range of possible market structures, which could 
become applicable to the liberalised electricity market. There are two extreme possible 
market structures, namely monopoly and perfect competition. In the monopoly case, 
there is one large and dominant firm (monopolist), as is the case of EdF in France. Due 
to its position, EdF could affect the market price of electricity in France in a liberalised 
market. In perfect competition, there are a substantial number of electricity producers 
with small market shares. None of the firms can execute any dominancy in the electricity 
market, and therefore, they cannot affect market prices. Between these two extreme mar-
ket structures, there is a wide range of other possibilities, which are the so-called oli-
gopolies. In the case of oligopolies, there are a limited number of medium-sized or large 
firms, and these firms dominate the supply of electricity. 
                                                   
1  Contract number NNE5-2001-00519. For more information on this project, one can refer to 
the website: http://www.uni-oldenburg.de/speed/english/projects/emelie.htm.  
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Due to the size of these firms, they can affect market prices. In Germany, for instance, 
the initial number of 30 small companies has reduced to four large firms over a time 
span of a few years due to the process of liberalisation. In order to reduce market power 
on the national markets, governments introduce maximum allowable market shares.  
Although these limitations apply to domestic markets, there is no restriction on acquiring 
market shares in adjoining markets. 
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Figure 1.1 The electricity market in eight European countries. 
Note:  The first (blue) percentages represent shares in electricity capacity and the second (red) 
 percentages represent shares in demand for electricity. 
 
If large firms all act in a similar way, by making production decisions simultaneously, 
the electricity market is said to end up in a so-called Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Alterna-
tively, one could imagine that one firm attempts to increase its market share and profits 
by supplying electricity below the price of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. This company 
subsequently increases its supply and market share. In fact, this firm strives for market 
leadership. In this setting, the electricity market is said to end up in a so-called Stackel-
berg equilibrium.  
Currently, there is still little known about the environmental consequences of the liber-
alisation process. The goal of liberalising the electricity market is to achieve more effi-
cient production due to more competition, and consequently lower electricity prices. This 
goal includes two opposite effects with respect to the environment. On the one hand, 
more efficient production can reduce the burden on the environment, and on the other 
hand, lower market prices imply higher demand for electricity, which is likely to be  
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accompanied with an increase of the burden on the environment. The environment is not 
necessarily worse-off in the case of high electricity prices. Another environmental issue 
is that since profit maximisation becomes increasingly important for private electricity 
producers, they are less likely to investment in renewable energy, while high efficiency 
production technologies might become less attractive.2 Moreover, in the near future, new 
developments, such as the implementation of the CO2 emission trading system in 2005, 
might have major impacts on the electricity market as well.  
Within this EMELIE project, we have developed a game theoretical model to gain in-
sight in this complex process of economic and environmental changes. With this model, 
we can study the consequences of various types of market behaviour of electricity pro-
ducers on different kinds of aspects. The main research question is: What will happen to 
the wholesale price of electricity, the demand for electricity, the profits of firms, and  
finally the different kind of emissions under different scenarios of producer behaviour? 
The EMELIE model as described in this report is an extended version of the original 
computational game theoretic model applied to the German electricity market as in 
Kemfert (1999), Kemfert and Tol (2000), and Lise et al. (2003). The original model is 
extended in four ways. First of all, the model considers 8 European countries instead of 
regions within Germany, where trade of electricity is possible among countries. Sec-
ondly, environmental impacts are calculated by adding emission factors to the generation 
technologies used for production in the EMELIE model. Thirdly, the present model dis-
tinguishes two load periods, peak load (hours with particularly high demands for elec-
tricity) and base load (hours with more average demands for electricity). For both load 
periods, we consider separate electricity markets. Finally, within the EMELIE model we 
can take cross-ownership relationships into account. The EMELIE model combines 
many different aspects of the electricity market, which makes it a unique model in com-
parison with other electricity market models (i.e. Bigano and Proost 2003; Amundsen 
and Bergman, 2002; Pineau and Murto, 2003).  
The present EMELIE model is a static year-based model and not an hour-based model, 
because we are interested in economic and environmental consequences of market pro-
ducer behaviour at the aggregate level. It is not our primary interest to address the eco-
nomic consequences of the daily electricity trade at the electricity exchanges. Further-
more, we make some simplifying assumptions on some relevant issues. For instance, we 
do not consider a separate market for green electricity (renewable energy). Also, in the 
case of combined heat and power (CHP) generation, we do not take into account the heat 
market. Finally, we do not consider substitution opportunities between natural gas and 
electricity.  
                                                   
2  The EU directive, 2001/77/EC, indicates to obtain a share in the consumption of renewable 
energy of 22.1% by 2010 for the electricity sector. Report available from: 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l_283/l_28320011027en00330040.pdf.  
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The outline of this report is as follows. Chapter 2 presents and discusses data on the  
electricity market in the EU8 countries for the base year 2000. A full and extensive  
description of the EMELIE model with trade and environmental constraints is given in 
Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 we discuss five different scenarios of producer behaviour. Chap-
ter 5 presents the results of these five scenarios; we consider this as the base run of the 
EMELIE model. In Chapter 6 we undertake a series of sensitivity analyses in order to 
verify the model parameters as used in the EMELIE model. The final chapter concludes. 
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2. Data characterising the European electricity market 
The EMELIE project has focused attention on the collection of data in eight EU  
countries for the year 2000. The data include information on individual electricity  
producers, demand and supply of electricity on the national electricity markets, the  
production technologies, the interconnection capacity between countries, transportation 
losses per country, emission factors of electricity production per country, and cross-
ownership shares between firms in the EU8 (Kemfert et al. 2004).  
2.1 Electricity producers 
In the electricity market of the EU8 we distinguish in total 34 different electricity  
producers or firms. Table 2.1 presents the list of companies and the location of the firms. 
In Belgium, Denmark and France, there are only two firms distinguished. In fact, these 
countries have one major electricity producer in terms of electricity capacity and several 
firms with a limited electricity capacity. These small firms are included in the fringe of a 
country. In Norway and Sweden, there are 7 firms distinguished including the fringe.  
From Table 2.1 we can also see that three companies are present in two countries, such 
as Vattenfall, EON, Electrabel and Fortum. For instance, Vattenfall originates from 
Sweden and it has a subsidiary in Germany. EON is from Germany and Electrabel is a 
Belgian company and both companies have a subsidiary in the Netherlands. Fortum 
(Finland) is the parent company of Fortum Kraft (Sweden). Next to these four subsidiar-
ies, there are more cross-ownership relationships within the EU8, which we will elabo-
rate on in Section 2.6. 
Furthermore, Table 2.1 shows the available production capacity per firm as well as the 
two main production technologies based on the available capacity. The three largest 
firms in the EU8 market are EdF (France), RWE (Germany) and E.ON (Germany). The 
electricity capacity of EdF is almost 75 GW, which is approximately 29% of the total 
electricity capacity in the EU8. The sizes of RWE and E.ON are less then one third of 
the size of EdF, as the electricity capacities of RWE and E.ON are 24.8 GW (9.6%) and 
21.5GW (8.3%) respectively. For all three firms nuclear power is the main or second 
technology. In particular, 80% of the electricity capacity of EdF is nuclear power. RWE 
and E.ON use lignite for electricity production. In Norway and Sweden, hydropower is 
often the main technology.  
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Table 2.1  Overview of firms in the EU8: location, available production capacity and 
main production technologies. 
Firms Country3 Acronym 
of firm 
Available 
production 
capacity 
(in GW) 
Main  
technology 
Second  
technology 
Fringe Belgium FrinBEL 1.226 Nuclear Gas 
Electrabel* Belgium ElectBEL 11.231 Nuclear Gas 
Fringe Denmark FrinDEN 1.926 CHP gas Wind 
ElsamE2 Denmark ElsamE2 7.085 Coal CHP gas 
Fringe Finland FrinFIN 5.959 CHP others CHP gas 
Fortum* Finland Fortum 4.157 Nuclear Coal 
PVO Finland PVO 2.646 Nuclear Coal 
Fringe France FrinFRA 16.131 CHP others Oil 
EDF France EDF 74.795 Nuclear Hydro 
Fringe Germany FrinGER 10.908 – – 
EnBW Germany EnBW 7.970 Coal Gas 
E.ON* Germany EONGER 21.459 Nuclear Lignite 
Vattenfall Germany VattenGER 14.371 Coal Gas 
RWE Germany RWE 24.809 Lignite Nuclear 
Fringe The Netherlands FrinNLD 2.856 CHP gas Gas 
Electrabel The Netherlands ElectNLD 3.980 Gas Coal 
NUON The Netherlands NUON 3.225 Gas Oil 
E.ON The Netherlands EONNLD 1.515 Coal Gas 
Essent The Netherlands Essent 3.336 Gas Coal 
Fringe Norway FrinNOR 0.582 Hydro Wind 
Statkraft Norway Statkraft 5.846 Hydro – 
OsloEn Norway OsloEn 4.903 Hydro – 
NorskHy Norway NorskHy 1.247 Hydro – 
Agder Norway Agder 1.020 Hydro Wind 
BKK Norway BKK 0.971 Hydro CHP others 
Lyse Norway Lyse 0.910 Hydro – 
Fringe Sweden FrinSWE 0.877 Oil CHP others 
Vattenfall* Sweden VattenSWE 4.403 Nuclear Hydro 
Sydkraft Sweden Sydkraft 9.702 Nuclear Hydro 
Birka Sweden Birka 4.522 Hydro Nuclear 
Fortum Kraft Sweden FortumK 3.069 Hydro Nuclear 
Skellefte Sweden Skellefte 0.988 Hydro Nuclear 
Graninge Sweden Graninge 0.413 Hydro – 
* Origin of firms, which are present in more than one country. 
 
 
                                                   
3  To make the upcoming tables more readable, we use the following acronyms to refer to the 8 
countries in the remainder of this report: Belgium (BEL), Denmark (DEN), Finland (FIN), 
France (FRA), Germany (GER), the Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), and Sweden 
(SWE). 
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2.2 Demand and supply 
The number of firms is not evenly distributed over the individual countries. Table 2.2. 
shows this. As explained before, there is a fictive firm in all countries, namely the price-
taking competitive fringe. These national fringes are actually a collection of individual 
and decentralised electricity production units, which often have a limited amount of elec-
tricity capacity. In the case of the Netherlands, however, the fringe owns approximately 
30% of total electricity capacity. In Belgium and France, where the liberalisation process 
is being introduced the latest, there is only one electricity producer next to the fringe, 
which can serve the whole local market and beyond.  
Table 2.2 Regional elasticities, electricity losses due to transport, reference price and 
reference demand in 2000. 
 BEL DEN FIN FRA GER NLD NOR SWE 
Number of firms 2 3 3 2 5 5 7 7 
Prices (€/MWh) 39.65 17.41 14.88 20.81 18.19 39.65 12.25 14.26 
Demand (GW) 9.04 3.75 8.72 46.88 54.45 11.48 12.66 15.46 
Source:  Kemfert et al (2004). 
 
Besides the 34 firms in the EU8 market, Table 2.2 also shows the reference demand and 
reference price for the eight national electricity markets in 2000. The electricity prices 
range form €12.25 in Norway to €39.65 in Belgium and the Netherlands. Germany has 
the largest demand for electricity, and Denmark the lowest.  
2.3 Trade and transmission losses 
Firms in the EMELIE model are assigned to a specific country. The EMELIE model in-
cludes the opportunity to trade electricity between countries. However there are two re-
strictions. Firstly, imports and exports to countries outside the EU8 are ignored in the 
model. Secondly, trade in the model is only allowed between neighbouring countries. 
The interregional transport capacity of the electricity network is as presented in Table 
2.3. Note that the table is asymmetric. The interconnection capacity from France to Bel-
gium (2,850 MW), for instance, is larger than the capacity from Belgium to France 
(2,500 MW). The transmission capacity within a country is considered to be unrestricted. 
Interconnections with non-EU8 countries are not taken into account. 
Electricity transmission through the electricity grid is accompanied by loss of electricity. 
These losses occur when electricity is transported within a country as well as between 
countries. The transmission losses within countries are at the diagonal of Table 2.4 and 
they differ across countries. The average transmission losses range from 3.9% of total 
amount of electricity produced in the Netherlands to 8.9% in Norway. We assume that 
the percentage of transmission losses of exported electricity is just the sum of the two 
domestic percentages of transmission losses. If a Dutch firm exports 1 TWh of electricity 
to Germany, it faces 8.4% (=3.9%+ 4.7%) transmission losses. A German firm would 
face the same 8.4% transmission losses if it exports electricity to the Netherlands.  
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Table 2.3 Transmission capacities between EU8 countries in MW’s. 
 BEL DEN FIN FRA GER NLD NOR SWE Total 
Belgium    2,500 0 1,400   3,900 
Denmark     1,750  950 1,900 4,600 
Finland       70 1,450 1,520 
France 2,850    1,150    4,000 
Germany 0 1,350  1,750  3,300  550 6,950 
Netherlands 1,400    3,300    4,700 
Norway  950 70     3,035 4,055 
Sweden  1,840 2,050  550  3,035  7,475 
Total 4,250 4,140 2,120 4,250 6,750 4,700 4,055 6,935  
Note:  An empty cell means that the countries are not neighbouring countries.  
Source: Kemfert et al (2004). 
 
Table 2.4  Transmission losses (percentage of produced electricity) within and between 
EU8 countries in MW’s. 
 BEL DEN FIN FRA GER NLD NOR SWE 
Belgium 4.5%  11.3%  8.4%   
Denmark  6.5%   11.2%  15.4% 14.7% 
Finland  3.5%    12.4% 11.7% 
France 11.3%  6.8% 11.5%    
Germany  11.2%  11.5% 4.7% 8.4%  12.9% 
The Netherlands 8.4%   8.4% 3.9%   
Norway  15.4% 12.4%    8.9% 17.1% 
Sweden  14.7% 11.7%  12.9%  17.1% 8.2% 
Note: An empty cell means that the electricity grids of neighbouring countries are not  
 connected, as is the case of Belgium and Germany.  
Source: Kemfert et al (2004). 
2.4 Production technologies 
For the EU8 we distinguish 12 different production technologies, namely eight fossil fuel 
based technologies, nuclear power, power from biomass, hydropower, and wind power. 
For coal, gas and oil, we distinguish between technologies which are either solely used 
for electricity production or for the combined cogeneration of heat and power. Table 2.5 
shows that individual countries have their own specialisation in technologies of electric-
ity production. Norway is specialised in hydropower while France relies on nuclear 
power. The installed capacity presented in Table 2.5 is corrected for the availability of 
the particular technology. The availability is reflected in an availability percentage, 
which is defined as the number of hours per year that a technology can be used for elec-
tricity production divided by the total number of hours per year. In the case of nuclear 
power or fire-based technologies, the availability percentage is 85%, while wind power 
is available for 23%. For hydropower, the availability percentage differs across coun-
tries. Among the largest producers of hydropower, the availability percentage is more 
than 50% in Norway and Sweden, while it is about 32% in France.  
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Table 2.5  Installed capacity (in GW) and assumed availability (in %) per technology 
in the EU8 countries. 
 BEL DEN FIN FRA GER NLD NOR SWE Availability
Nuclear 5.71  2.64 63.18 21.37 0.45  9.46 85.6% 
Coal 2.95 5.10 2.29 12.69 17.86 4.05   85.6% 
Lignite     18.97    85.6% 
Gas 3.50 0.04 0.90 1.89 13.82 7.17   85.6% 
Oil 1.20 0.79 1.24 12.23 8.11 0.99  4.64 85.6% 
CHP-gas 0.58 2.58 1.80  0.99 4.66  0.13 85.6% 
CHP-coal  1.13 1.47  6.96   0.56 85.6% 
CHP-oil 0.10  0.16  0.30   0.65 85.6% 
CHP-bio 0.29 0.23 1.04   0.64  0.46 85.6% 
CHP-others   1.44 6.64   0.20 1.00 85.6% 
Hydro 1.40 0.01 2.88 25.60 11.61 0.04 27.46 16.33  
Wind 0.01 2.42 0.04 0.08 0.36 0.44 0.01 0.25 22.8% 
Total 15.74 12.30 15.89 122.31 100.33 18.44 27.67 33.48  
Availability 13.7% Hydro 34.2% 57.3% 31.9% 32.6% 40.0% 56.8% 54.4%  
Note:  The capacity is corrected for availability. Availability is the share of regular number of 
 hours that the technology is available for production. Except for hydropower, the  
 availability is the same for all countries. Empty cells mean that the technology is absent 
 in the country. 
Source: Kemfert et al (2004). 
Table 2.6 presents the variable costs for producing electricity. Variable costs are calcu-
lated as gross production costs, consisting of fuel cost including taxes and costs for op-
eration and management including taxes. We assume that the variable production costs 
differ across regions and technologies, but not across producers. Thus, if two firms lo-
cated in a country explore the same production technology, they face the same variable 
costs. If two firms located in different countries explore the same production technology, 
the variable production costs might differ, as in the case of coal technology for instance. 
Empty cells in Table 2.6 reflect the absence of particular technologies in a country. 
Denmark, for example, has no nuclear power, and Norway has no gas-fired technologies. 
Table 2.6  Variable costs (€/MWh) per technology in the EU8 countries. 
 BEL DEN FIN FRA GER NLD NOR SWE 
Nuclear 6.14  6.14 6.14 6.14 6.14  7.50 
Coal 16.94 13.83 13.97 15.19 14.42 16.83   
Lignite     14.42    
Gas 24.22 23.81 20.28 23.83 29.04 23.25   
Oil 36.42 35.21 35.21 38.84 38.70 41.21  39.83 
CHP-gas 13.29 13.08 11.21  15.85 12.78  13.52 
CHP-coal  7.57 7.63  7.84   11.73 
CHP-oil 19.58 19.58 19.58  21.43   21.58 
CHP-bio 19.94 19.94 19.94   19.94  19.94 
CHP-others   14.59 16.69   16.69 16.69 
Hydro 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.18 
Wind 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note:  An empty cell means that the technology is not used in the country.  
Source: Kemfert et al (2004). 
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2.5 Emission factors 
For the 12 technologies, we have used emission factors for six gases, namely CO2, SO2, 
NOx, CH4, N2O and PM10 (Heinzow, 2004, personal communication). From these gases, 
we have derived three environmental themes, namely greenhouse gas emissions, acidifi-
cation, and smog formation (due to emissions of fine particles). For greenhouse gases we 
use CO2 emission equivalents, where 0.310 kg N2O = 0.021 kg CH4 = 1 kg CO2. One 
unit of acidification is equivalent to 1/32 SO2 = 1/46 NO2. The emission factor of smog 
is simply the amount of PM10 emitted. The emission factors differ across technologies 
and countries. Table 2.7, Table 2.8, and Table 2.9 present the emission factors for green-
house gas emission, acidification and smog formation respectively.  
Table 2.7  Greenhouse gas emission factors (kg CO2 equivalents/MWh) per technology 
in the EU8 countries. 
 BEL DEN FIN FRA GER NLD NOR SWE 
Nuclear 0  0 0 0 0  0 
Coal 920.0 972.2 915.9 915.9 970.0 915.9   
Lignite     1219.7    
Gas 388.0 327.2 348.9 401.9 348.9 411.0   
Oil 877.3 692.6 877.3 756.8 877.3 877.3  877.3 
CHP-gas 330.6 673.9 528.3  327.1 327.1  327.1 
CHP-coal  948.9 776.1  33.1   733.1 
CHP-oil 503.4  503.4  503.4   503.4 
CHP-bio 0.0 81.9 2.1   0.0  0.0 
CHP-others   1296.1 401.6   403.4 403.4 
Hydro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wind 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: An empty cell means that the technology is not used in the country.  
Source: Heinzow (2004, personal communication) and own calculations. 
 
Table 2.8 Emission factors for acidifying emissions (g acid equivalents/MWh) per 
technology in the EU8 countries. 
 BEL DEN FIN FRA GER NLD NOR SWE 
Nuclear 0  0 0 0 0  0 
Coal 31.549 20.699 23.310 31.549 23.307 28.365   
Lignite     33.896    
Gas 5.901 2.174 4.522 15.435 4.522 6.783   
Oil 21.821 2.486 21.821 25.610 21.821 21.821  21.821 
CHP-gas 2.174 19.833 6.848  2.174 2.174  2.174 
CHP-coal  20.217 32.459  2.649   2.649 
CHP-oil 2.486  2.486  2.486   2.486 
CHP-bio 7.160 31.692 46.726   7.160  12.288 
CHP-others   83.071 15.435   3.736 3.736 
Hydro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wind 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: An empty cell means that the technology is not used in the country.  
Source: Heinzow (2004, personal communication) and own calculations. 
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Table 2.9 Emission factors for smog formation (g fine particles /MWh) per technology 
in the EU8 countries. 
 BEL DEN FIN FRA GER NLD NOR SWE 
Nuclear 0  0 0 0 0  0 
Coal 80.0 57.0 172.9 170.0 66.0 17.0   
Lignite     96.0    
Gas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   
Oil 21.0 1.0 3.0 130.0 2.0 2.0  21.0 
CHP-gas 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 
CHP-coal  57.0 150.0  10.0   10.0 
CHP-oil 1.0  2.0  2.0   2.0 
CHP-bio 30.0 0.0 21.0   30.0  233.0 
CHP-others   195.0 0.0   1.0 1.0 
Hydro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wind 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: An empty cell means that the technology is not used in the country.  
Source: Heinzow (2004, personal communication). 
 
With the emission factors, we can include environmental constraints in the model which 
reflects a certain degree of environmental policy. However, we have to be careful with 
this interpretation, because the electricity sector is not the only emitting sector in the 
economy. Since the EMELIE model focuses attention on the electricity market, objec-
tives of environmental policy with respect to emissions have to be translated into specific 
objectives for the electricity sector. The emission factors are specific for the technologies 
of electricity production per country.  
Since we focus attention on three environmental themes, nuclear power, hydropower and 
wind power do not have any environmental impact. For all three technologies, the emis-
sion factors are zero. The dirtiest technologies are the technologies which combust coal, 
lignite or oil. In some cases there is asymmetry in emission factors. For instance, the 
technology CHP-others in Finland has high emission factors for acidification and smog 
formation, while it has a very low emission factor for green house gas emissions.  
2.6 Cross-ownership 
Table 2.10 presents the cross-ownership shares of the companies in the EU8 in 2000.4 
Since we only consider the EU8 electricity market, we ignore any cross-ownership with 
companies residing in non-EU8 countries. Four subsidiaries are fully owned by parent 
companies: Electrabel Netherlands, EON Netherlands, Vattenfall Germany, Fortum 
Kraft (Sweden). For convenience, Table 2.10 presents a condensed matrix of cross-
ownership, and companies not mentioned are independent companies with respect to 
other companies in the EU8. Since we distinguish 34 firms, the total matrix of cross-
ownership is a square matrix with order 34.  
                                                   
4  As we calibrate the EMELIE model on the data of the year 2000, we present the cross-
ownership shares of this year. However, the market of electricity producers is highly active 
due to the liberalisation process, and actual shares of cross-ownership may differ from those 
in Table 2.10.  
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Table 2.10  Condensed cross-ownership shares of firms in the EU8. 
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Parent  
companies  DEN FIN GER GER NLD NLD NOR NOR SWE SWE SWE SWE
Electrabel BEL     100%        
Fortum FIN          50% 100%  
EdF FRA            36%
E.ON GER   -   100%   21%   13%
Statkraft NOR       20% 26% 35%    
Vattenfall SWE 4%   100%   39%      
Sydkraft SWE   1%      -   23%
Graninge SWE  1%          - 
Total  4% 1% 1% 100% 100% 100% 59% 26% 56% 50% 100% 72%
Source: Van der Woerd and Lise (2004). 
 
Table 2.10 also shows that in the EU8, there are four full subsidiaries, Electrabel  
Belgium owns Electrabel in the Netherlands, Fortum Kraft in Sweden is owned by  
Fortum (Finland), E.On (Germany) owns E.On Benelux in the Netherlands, and  
Vattenfall in Germany is fully owned by Vattenfall in Sweden. In all four cases, the  
location of the parent company differs from the location of the subsidiary.  
Most cross-ownership relations are trans-boundary. Only Statkraft from Norway has a 
share in BKK and Oslo Energi are both located in Norway. Another example is Sydkraft 
(Sweden) that has a share in Graningen. For a more detailed discussion on the cross-
ownership issue in the European electricity market, we refer to Van der Woerd and Lise 
(2004).  
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3. The EMELIE model 
The EMELIE model is a game theoretic model of the liberalised electricity market. With 
the EMELIE model we can study economic and environmental consequences of different 
kinds of producer behaviour. The model is based on profit maximization of the electric-
ity producers including features such as capacity constraints of production (per technol-
ogy) and interconnection in the case of trade between countries, and emission restrictions 
due to environmental policy. Besides, the model distinguishes two load periods, namely 
peak hours (hours during the day) and base hours (hours at night). All in all, the main 
feature of the model is that it allows one to assess different kinds of producer behaviour 
in the case of market power in a liberalised electricity market. 
Table 3.1 presents the sets and indices, parameters and variables of the EMELIE model.  
Table 3.1 Indices, parameters and variables in the EMELIE model. 
Sets and indices Description Units 
F Firms  
I Technologies i ∈ I  
R Regions/countries r ∈ R  
L Load period l ∈ L = {base, peak}  
K Emission type k ∈ K = {ghg, acid, pm10}  
Fr* Firms in country r*  
Parameters:   
cvi,r Variable production costs € per MWh 
d0r,l Reference demand for electricity TWh 
p0r,l Reference price for electricity € per MWh 
εr,l Price elasticity of electricity demand  
λr,r* Loss of electricity due to transport % 
ηr,r* Maximum trade possibility MW 
σi,r,k Emission factor  g per MWh  
qmaxi,f Maximum production capacity GW 
Ek Emission permits g  
hl Number of operating hours  
ξf,l Reduction in ‘market power’ mark-up  
Variables:   
Πf Profit of firm f € 
pr,l Market price for electricity € per MWh 
cmi,f,r,l Marginal costs of electricity production TWh 
µi,f,l Shadow price of capacity constraint € per MWh 
τr,r*,l Shadow price of trade constraint € per MWh 
κk Shadow price of emission constraint € per MWh 
ϑf r,l Supply share of the market per firm % 
sf r,l Supply of electricity per firm TWh 
Sr,l Total supply of electricity per region TWh 
qi,f,r,l Production of electricity TWh 
xr,r*,l Net trade between region r and region r* TWh 
Emk Current level of emissions  g  
Note: The model is written as a Mixed Complementary Problem (MCP). The parameters of 
 the model are exogenous in the model, while the model determines the value of the  
 variables.  
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In a liberalised electricity market, firms maximise their profits by producing electricity 
with different kinds of technologies i, and by selling this electricity in the countries of a 
European market. In particular, producers distinguish between two separate markets 
based on the peak in electricity demand, namely peak hours and base hours. The profits 
are the difference between the revenues from selling electricity and the costs of  
production. The prices of electricity differ across countries and load periods and in addi-
tion these prices might depend on the level of total electricity demand in a country dur-
ing a particular load period. This dependency reflects particular strategic behaviour of 
the electricity producers. The firms base their decision on the amount of electricity pro-
duced given the load period, technology and market (qi,f,r,l). The profit function for firm f 
is:  
( )( ) v, , , , , * , , ,f l r l r l f r l l i r i f r
l L r R l L r R i I
h p S s h c q
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
 Π = −   ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ l  (3.1)
The first term reflects the total amount of revenues from supplying electricity, while the 
second term summarizes the total amount of costs of electricity production. Note that the 
revenues depend on the amount of electricity supplied, and the costs depend on the 
amount of electricity produced by a given technology. The difference between the 
amount of electricity supplied or produced will be discussed below.  
Firms maximise profits, although they cannot maximise profits unrestrictedly. There are 
three constraints that firms have to consider. First of all, the production of electricity is 
limited to the maximum operational electricity capacity owned by the firm. Since one of 
our main interests is to evaluate the environmental impacts, we focus on production of 
electricity and we ignore firms that only trade electricity. This does not rule out trade  
between countries, which is accompanied by the second restriction: the maximum  
capacity of the interconnections between countries. Finally, we include the possibility to 
impose emission restrictions on the production of electricity. Before we derive the three 
constraints of the model, we first define a number of identities.  
3.1 Identities 
There are three ‘identities’ in the static model. Firstly, we define the regional demand Sr,l 
for electricity per load period. The demand function is a Constant Elasticity of Substitu-
tion (CES function) which depends on the elasticity parameter εr,l, the reference demand 
 and a reference price 0,r ld
0
,r lp . The price elasticity of demand is then –εr,l. We assume 
that regional electricity market clear due to market prices. The demand function is as  
follows: 
( ) ,, ,0
, , , , 0
,
r l
r l r l
r l f r l r l
f F r l
p S
S s d
p
ε−
∈
 = =    ∑  (3.2)
Secondly, due to the distribution of electricity, there are transportation losses which are a 
share of the production, denoted by λr*,r, where firm f is located in region r*. If a firm f 
located in region r* exports s* units of electricity to region r during peak hours, it has to 
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produce *,* /(1 )r rs λ−  units of electricity. More generally, the supply of electricity is a 
fraction of electricity production, where firm f is located in region r*: 
( ), , *, , , ,1f r l r r i f r l
i I
s qλ
∈
= − ∑  (3.3)
Thirdly, the regional market shares of firm f during load period l are given by: 
, ,
, ,
, ,
f r l
f r l
g r l
g F
s
s
ϑ
∈
= ∑  (3.4)
Firm f does not necessarily have to be located in region r, because we allow firms to 
trade across borders, as we will discuss later on.  
3.2 Constraints 
Next to the identities, the model considers three different restrictions: two capacity  
constraints on production and trade, and one (optional) environmental constraint on 
emissions. The electricity production per technology of a firm f is restricted. The  
constraints are due to physical constraints (technologies using incineration) or due to 
climate conditions (wind or solar power). Therefore, there is an upper bound to the  
production capacity. This upper bound is complementary to the shadow price µi,f,l, which 
obtains a nonnegative value as soon as the production with technology i, by firm f,  
during load period l, is equal to the maximum capacity: 
max
, , , , , ,0i f r l i f i f l
r R
q q µ
∈
≤ ⊥ ≤∑  (3.5)
Due to the liberalisation of the electricity market, firms have the opportunity to export 
their electricity to other countries. However, the maximum amount of electricity export 
is limited with respect to the interconnection capacity between two countries. The 
amount of net export between the countries r* and r is the exported amount of electricity 
from region r* for region r minus the imported amount of electricity entering region r* 
from region r, where firm f is located in country r* ( *rf F∈ ): 
*
*, , , , , *,
r r
r r l f r l g r l
f F g F
x s s
∈ ∈
= −∑ ∑  (3.6)
These exports are restricted too, which is complementary to shadow price τr,r*,l. As is 
usual with mixed complementary conditions, the shadow price of trade is zero, when the 
trade restriction is not binding: 
*, , *, *, ,0r r l r r r r lx η τ≤ ⊥ ≤  (3.7)
If *, ,r r lx <0, then country r* imports electricity from county r. We do not impose a  
restriction on net imports of country r*, because those are implicitly imposed by the  
export restrictions of other countries. In such a way, the import and export capacity of  
interconnections can differ. We assume that there is no ‘trade’ restriction on electricity 
produced and consumed within a country.  
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As a further extension/restriction of the model, emissions constraints can be added as 
well. For instance, due to the Kyoto protocol and various other kinds of environmental 
legislation, firms have to be careful to stay under the emission limits. This constraint can 
be included in the model by delimiting the total amount of emissions, where shadow 
price κk is nonzero as soon as the current amount of emissions is equal to a predefined 
emission ceiling: 
, *, , , , 0k l i r k i f r l k
l L r R i I f F
Em h q E kσ κ
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
= ≤∑ ∑∑∑ ⊥ ≤  (3.8)
Emission factors are associated with the region of electricity production of firm f rather 
than the region of supply.  
3.3 Profit maximisation in the electricity market  
Since we assume a liberalised electricity market, we assume all firms to maximize prof-
its: The operating profit function is summarized by the profit function in (3.1) with the 
identity in (3.3), and it is subjected to the production capacity constraint in (3.5), the 
trade constraint in (3.7), and the emission constraint in (3.8). Thus, the operating profit 
of the electricity producer f located in country r* reads (note that this is the Lagrangian 
of the optimisation problem):  
( )( )
( )
v
, , *, , , , , * , , ,
max
, , , , , ,
*, , *, , *,
,
*
, *, , , ,
1f l r l r l r r i f r l l i r i f r
l L r R i I l L r R i I
l i f l i f r l i f
l L i I r R
l r r l r r l r r
l L r R
r r
k l i r k i f r l k
k K l r R i I f F
h p S q h c q
h q q
h x
h q E
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µ
τ η
κ σ
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
∈ ∈ ∈
∈ ∈≠
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
  Π = − −    
 − −  
− −
− −
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑ ∑∑∑ .
L∈
   ∑
l

 
(3.9)
Since the restrictions are inequalities rather than equalities, we have to derive the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions of maximising an objective function. The first-order condition can be 
derived from the profits in (3.9) by taking the derivative with respect to the production of 
electricity qi,f,r,l for firm f located in country r* ( *rf F∈ ) and by setting the expression 
to 0:  
( ) ( )
( )
, , v
*, , , ,
,
, ,
*, *, ,
, *,
1 1
1
0.
f r l
r r r l r l i r
r l
i f l
r r r r l
k i r k
k K
p S c
ϑλ ε
µ
λ τ
κ σ
∈
  − −      
−
− −
−
=
∑
−
 
(3.10)
To complete the Kuhn Tucker conditions, we have the constraints in (3.5), (3.7), and 
(3.8), the non-negativity restriction on all shadow prices the amount of electricity  
produced qi,f,r,l, and finally the identities in (3.2), (3.3), (3.4) and (3.6). 
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So far, we have not elaborated on the cost of electricity production. In economic models, 
production functions are usually well-defined functions (convex, continuous and differ-
entiable). In the EMELIE model, however, the production costs differ across technolo-
gies and countries. In fact, the production functions are step functions with respect to 
variable costs (technology), but they also include the dimensions of supply regions and 
load periods. The marginal costs function of producing a unit of electricity can be  
derived from (3.10):  
( )m v, , , , * , , *, *, , , *,1 .i f r l i r i f l r r r r l k i r k
k K
c c µ λ τ κ σ
∈
= + + − +∑  (3.11)
The first term on the right-hand side in (3.11) the production costs of supplying  
electricity. Note that the production costs of one unit of electricity supply are equal to the 
variable production cost corrected for transmission losses. The second and third term on 
the right hand side in Equation (3.11) are respectively the shadow prices of maximum 
production capacity per technology and the restrictions of trade. The fourth term on the 
left-hand side in Equation (3.12) represents the addition to the production cost due to 
emission factors associated with the related technology. 
We use a MCP approach in which the marginal costs are implicitly determined by the 
model. However, we need a criterion to determine whether or not a firm is willing to 
produce electricity. This criterion is that the marginal revenue of electricity production 
has to be equal to or greater than the marginal cost of production. From (3.10), we derive 
the single MCP equation in terms of qi,f,r,l,: 
( ) ( ) , , m*, , , , , , , , ,
,
1 1 0 0f r lr r r l r l i f r l i f r l
r l
p S c q
ϑλ ε
 − − − ≥ ⊥   
≤  (3.12)
The marginal costs are as defined in (3.11). This inequality is complementary to the level 
of electricity production with technology i, at firm f, to be delivered in region r, during 
load period l. This means that a nonnegative production is profitable as long as the  
marginal cost of electricity produced by firm f during load period l is equal to or lower 
than the marginal revenues. 
3.4 Different types of firm behaviour 
The first term on the left hand side in Equation (3.13) represents the marginal income 
from electricity sales within a regional market for a particular load period. The optimal 
amount of sales depends upon firms’ type of behaviour. For instance, the marginal  
revenue from regional electricity sales is lowered by a market-power mark-up (ϑ/ε) in 
Equation (3.12). This is the case of quantity competition, which we refer to as the STRA 
scenario. 
The monopoly mark-up can also be zero. This is the case of price competition, which we 
refer to as the COMP scenario. This leads to the following first order condition: 
( ) m*, , , , , , , ,1 0r r r l i f r l i f r lp c qλ− − ≥ ⊥ ≤0  (3.13)
It is also possible to extend the static model with an alternative firm behaviour. Let us 
consider the case where one firm is a leader and considers the possibility of moving first, 
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assuming that the (re)action of other firms is determined by equation (3.12). The action 
of the leading firm can then be modified, by scaling the monopoly mark-up, as follows: 
( ) ( ) , , m*, , , , , , , , , ,
,
1 1 0 0f r lr r r l r l f l i f r l i f r l
r l
p S c q
ϑλ ξ ε
 − − − ≥ ⊥   
≤  (3.14)
where ξf,l is a fraction between zero and one, which lowers the monopoly mark-up of the 
leader. The consequence for leading firm f of setting ξf,l is that firm f is able to increase 
its payoff, by increasing production during load type l, while the reaction of other firms 
is to lower their production somewhat and see a reduction in their payoffs.5 We refer to 
the case where the leader chooses factor ξf,l in such a way to maximise its payoffs as the 
STACK scenario. Payoffs or profits are defined as the difference between incomes from 
all regional sales minus the total cost of production: 
( ) v, , , , , * , , ,f l r l r l f r l i r i f r l
l L r R i I
h p S s c q
∈ ∈ ∈
 Π = −  ∑ ∑ ∑  (3.15)
Hence, the static EMELIE model consists of 8 variables (qi,f,r,l, τr,r*,l, µi,f,l, κk, sf,r,l, ϑf,r,l, 
pr,l, xr,r*,l) and 8 equations (times the indices), namely (3.2)–(3.8), (3.14). Moreover, 
there is a set of firms F located in R different regions or countries. Furthermore, we  
consider a number of emissions, K and load types, L. 
3.5 Cross-ownership 
So far, we have implicitly assumed that firms are independent and act independently. 
The only possible strategic behaviour is reflected in the reaction curves of (independent) 
individual firms. However, firms can also act strategically in a different way, namely by 
acquiring other electricity producing companies. This acquisition is not limited to the 
domestic country of acquiring firms. Especially, the quickest way for firms to get a  
market share at foreign markets is to take-over a foreign company or to purchase assets 
of foreign firms.  
In that case, the parent company (the firm holding assets of other firms) maximises  
profits from its own production activities as well as it takes into account – part of – the 
profits of its – partly – owned companies. Amundsen and Bergman (2002) have assessed 
the impact of this cross-ownership in the electricity market. There are two types of own-
ership: active and passive cross-ownership. In the case of active ownership, parent  
companies use the subsidiaries to exercise their power in order to enlarge their market 
share. The effect on the reaction curve resulting from the first-order condition is rather 
complicated. In the case of passive cross-ownership, parent companies take into account 
the value of subsidiaries, while in the case of active cross-ownership parent companies 
                                                   
5  It is not possible to get an explicit algebraic expression for the value of ξf,l for firm f. The  
appropriate value, at present, can be derived numerically. This extension of the model shows 
how a first-move-advantage can be captured. 
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allocate the electricity capacity of subsidiaries in order to enlarge market shares and  
subsequently market power.6  
Similar to Amundsen and Bergman (2002), we assume passive ownership in the 
EMELIE model, so that firm f maximises its value instead of its profit. Although this 
type of cross-ownership seems rather simplistic, passive cross-ownership does take into 
account all cross-ownership relations.  
The value of firm f(Vf) is defined as the profit of firm f plus the sum of ownership  
fraction times the value of other firms: 
,f f f g
g f
V Vδ
≠
= Π +∑ g  (3.16)
where δf,f = 0 by definition, and 0 ≤ δf,g ≤ 1 for f ≠ g, and Πf is the profit of function f as 
defined in (3.9). If firm f does not hold any assets of other firms, then the value of firm f 
is equal to its profit, i.e Vf = Πf . From (3.16), we can see that the total value of firm f is 
defined irrespectively from the location of the – partly – owned firms partly owned. For 
convenience, we can also use matrix notation for the value of firms: 
[ ] 1V I D −= − Π  (3.17)
where V and Π are vectors of values of firms and profits of firms respectively, and D is 
the matrix of cross-ownership shares. We define df,g as the elements of the matrix [I–D]–
1. If all firms are independent (no cross-ownership at all), the values of each firm is equal 
to it profit, i.e. V = Π. Now, we can express the value of firm f as a function of profits of 
all other firms:  
,f f g
g F
V d
∈
= Π∑ g  (3.18)
Firm f now maximizes its value from (3.18). The first-order conditions follow from sub-
stituting (3.9) into (3.18) for all firms and then by taking the first derivative with respect 
to qi,f,r,l . The first-order condition then reads  
( ) ( ) , , , m*, , , , , , , , , ,
, ,
1 1 0 0f g g r lr r r l r l f l i f r l i f r l
g F f f r l
d
p S c q
d
ϑλ ξε∈
 − − − ≥ ⊥   ∑ ≤
                                                  
 (3.19)
With respect to the first-order condition in (3.14), the market power mark-up has 
changed slightly. Hence, to assess the impact of passive cross-ownership in a liberalised 
electricity market we only need to known the matrix of cross-ownership shares.  
 
 
 
6  Due to the fact that active cross-ownership will increase the complexity of the model  
considerably, we ignore this type of cross-ownership for the time being.  
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4. Scenarios of electricity producer behaviour 
With the EMELIE model, as presented in the Chapter 3, we can study economic and  
environmental consequences of the electricity market under different types of producer 
behaviour. Two aspects are essential to distinguish different types of producer behaviour, 
namely strategic behaviour of firms and cross-ownership between firms. In this section 
we discuss five different scenarios of producer behaviour, which we will use for our 
EMELIE model simulations and sensitivity analysis. The differences between the scenar-
ios is reflected in the different values of the market power mark-ups (ξf,l) in equation 
(3.14). Table 4.1 summarizes the (ranges of) values of the market power mark-ups of the 
different scenarios. 
Table 4.1 Scenarios of market behaviour of electricity producers in the EMELIE 
model. 
Firms REF/COMP STRA STACK CROSS 
Competing firms per country ξf,l =0 ξf,l =1 ξf,l =1 ξf,l =1 
 One of theses competing firms sets production   0≤ξf,l ≤1  
 Some competing firms have cross ownership    –1≤ξf,l ≤1 
Fringe (non-competing firms) ξf,l =0 ξf,l =0 ξf,l =0 ξf,l =0 
 
With the data of the EU8 countries for the year 2000 as discussed in Chapter 2, the 
EMELIE model is calibrated. In the calibration, we assume that firms minimise cost, 
take (reference) prices as given and serve given demand (supply meets demand). We re-
fer to this scenario as the reference (REF) scenario. In fact, this scenario reflects the ac-
curacy of the EMELIE model. It is hard to give an interpretation to the REF scenario for 
two reasons. Firstly, the implementation of the liberalisation process of the national elec-
tricity markets is in progress in most countries of the EU. Secondly, most electricity 
markets are regulated markets, so that the prices do not reflect appropriate market prices 
for electricity.  
The second scenario is the ideal focal point and the best achievable outcome of liberali-
sation, in terms of the lowest retail prices. No single electricity producer can exercise 
any market power. In other words, all firms act as a price taker (for all firms ξf,l=0), and 
they produce at marginal cost. This is the case of full competition, and we refer to this 
scenario as COMP scenario. 
In a liberalised market, there is also a possibility that large firms will exercise market 
power, or act strategically. We consider three strategic competition scenarios: STRA, 
STACK, and CROSS. In the STRA scenario, large firms set quantities of supply by ex-
ercising market power. Due to the market power, firms will supply electricity at higher 
prices than the marginal costs, so that the supply curves in Figure 4.1 become steeper. 
All strategically acting firms exercise market power in a similar way (ξf,l =1) and others 
(fringe) do not (ξf,l =0). Note that we ignore any possible cross-ownership relations. 
Next, the strategically competing firms in the STRA scenario are assumed to act simi-
larly in the STACK scenario as well. Different from the STRA scenario, however, one 
competing firm is expected to behave as a price fighter. In fact, the price-fighting firm 
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can foresee the reaction curves of its competitors, so that it can set production in order to 
enlarge its production, and consequently its market share and profits. The value of ξf,l of 
this firm is in the range from 0 to 1, while the strategically competing firms have ξf,l =1, 
and the non-competing firms have ξf,l =0. 
Based on the available production capacity, EdF (France) is the largest firm in the EU8, 
and it would be logical to assign EdF as a market leader. However, simulations with the 
EMELIE model have shown that EdF can hardly benefit from being a market leader, be-
cause it has no competitors in the French market. Therefore, we choose RWE (Ger-
many), because it is the second largest firm in the EU8, and it has competitors at its do-
mestic market. We take RWE as the ‘potential’ market leader in this report to show the 
consequences for one of the many possible STACK scenarios. We acknowledge that the 
choice of any other firm to become market leader will affect the results of this scenario.  
Finally, we study the CROSS scenario. In fact, the CROSS scenarios is similar to the 
STRA scenario with one extension. Firms consider cross-ownership relations as well. 
Thus, firms maximise their values rather than their profits. The value of ξf,l of firm with 
cross-ownership relations can be derived from the model ex-post and it is in the range 
from –1 to 1, while the competing firms without cross-ownership relations have ξf,l =1, 
and the non-competing firms have ξf,l =0. 
Figure 4.1 present the electricity market equilibriums for the different scenarios REF, 
COMP, STRA and STACK. In the EMELIE model we assume that markets clear 
through a market-clearing price. The decreasing curve in Figure 4.1 represents consumer 
demand, which is fixed in each situation. The increasing curves in Figure 4.1 represent 
marginal supply curves, which can be pushed up by exercising market power, leading to 
various equilibria in the electricity market. 
COMP
REF
STACK
STRA
price
demand/supply
 
Figure 4.1 Demand and supply for various types of firm equilibrium behaviour. 
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5. Results 
The liberalisation process will change the performances of electricity markets. Policy 
makers believe that more competition between electricity producers will lower the costs 
of electricity production, which will subsequently lower the market prices. The question 
remains, however, how will electricity producers eventually behave in a liberalised  
market? With the EMELIE model, we try to gain more insights in the mechanism of a 
‘European-wide’ liberalised electricity market. 
Below, we discuss the results of the EMELIE model for five different scenarios as  
discussed in Chapter 4. The REF scenario is the reference case in which the national – 
regulated – electricity markets in 2000 are replicated with the EMELIE model by mini-
mizing production costs given the electricity prices and the demand for electricity. The 
second scenario has full competition in the electricity market (COMP), where all  
electricity producers act as price takers. The third scenario is the case where large firms 
act strategically and simultaneously, while the fringe continues to be fully competitive. 
The reaction curve of the strategically acting firms is given by equation (3.14) with ξf,l=1 
and ξf,l=0 for the fringe. In the STACK scenario, RWE (Germany) behaves as a price 
fighter, while the other firms follow a similar behaviour as in the STRA scenario. In  
particular, RWE foresees how its competitors behave in the electricity market and it  
allocates its production in such a way that it enlarges its market share and profits. The 
value of ξRWE,l is within the range form 0 to 1 given its reaction curve in (3.14). Finally, 
we present the CROSS scenario, in which firms maximize their values instead of their 
profits.  
In Chapter 2, we discussed the data for the calibration of the EMELIE model. In addi-
tion, the EMELIE model requires also information on price elasticities and the division 
of prices and demand between load periods. Except for Denmark and the Netherlands, in 
which the electricity of demand is assumed to be somewhat more price inelastic (–0.29), 
the price elasticity of demand is assumed to be –0.4, as in Lise et al. (2003). One might 
argue that this value of price elasticity is rather high, but by following the survey of 
Pineau and Murto (2003), a price elasticity of –0.4 reflects the alternatives for consumers 
to choose its electricity supplier abroad. Following Pineau and Murto (2003), we assume 
that the (regional) price elasticity of electricity demand for peak load is twice the elastic-
ity of demand for base load. This assumption implies that the demand for peak load is 
more elastic than for base load. 
Table 5.1 shows the reference demand and reference price for the eight national electric-
ity markets in 2000. In the model we consider two load periods, namely peak and base 
load, and consequently we consider different demand functions for both load periods.  
Per year there are h = 365*24 = 8,760 load hours to be served. We assume that 20% of 
the year concerns peak load hpeak = 1,752 hours and the remaining 80% of the year con-
cerns base load hbase = 7,008 hours. In addition, we assume that demand at peak hours in 
region r requires 90% of total available capacity: d0r,peak = 0.9 Σf Σiqmaxi,f for all rf F∈  
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Table 5.1 Reference price and reference demand per load period in 2000. 
 BEL DEN FIN FRA GER NLD NOR SWE 
Prices (€/MWh)         
Average 39.65 17.41 14.88 20.81 18.19 39.65 12.25 14.26 
Peak load 35.69 15.67 13.39 18.72 16.37 35.69 11.03 12.83 
Base load 51.67 19.69 19.04 24.68 23.29 52.01 16.49 18.06 
Demand (GW)         
Total 9.04 3.75 8.72 46.88 54.45 11.48 12.66 15.46 
Peak load 8.49 2.66 8.03 38.14 50.17 10.87 12.28 14.06 
Base load 11.21 8.11 11.49 81.83 71.56 13.94 14.20 21.07 
 
Also, we assume that the price of electricity under base load is 90% of the average price: 
p0r,base = 0.9 p0r. Then, the reference demand at base hours, d0r,base, and the reference price 
of electricity at peak hours, p0r,peak, are derived by the following two demand and price 
balance equations and the results are presented in Table 5.1: 
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This section discusses the results of the five scenarios of the EMELIE model. First, we 
discuss the impact of the liberalisation process on the –domestic– electricity markets. 
Then, we discuss the impact on the performance of individual firms, and finally we  
discuss the environmental consequences of market liberalisation.  
Table 5.2 shows the resulting prices and supply in the EU8 for the five different  
scenarios. The total electricity supply in the EU8 is 1,423 TWh at an average price of 
€20.62 per MWh (REF scenario). The average electricity prices differ across countries, 
where Belgium and the Netherlands have a high price of almost €40, and Norway has the 
lowest price of €12.25. Since costs are minimized given total electricity demand, the 
electricity prices reflect the variable costs of production present in the country. Electric-
ity production in Norway, for instance, consist primarily of cheap hydropower, while 
Belgium and the Netherlands electricity production relies on the use of more expensive 
fossil fuels based technologies; see Table 2.5 with the overview of the electricity  
capacity. 
In the COMP scenario, all electricity producers act as price takers, which means that 
they produce electricity regardless of the electricity supply of their competitors and 
given the market price. Then, total electricity supply increases, while the average  
electricity price in the EU8 decreases. In the COMP scenario, the electricity supply in 
Belgium, France, and the Netherlands increases, while the electricity prices decline in 
comparison with the REF scenario. In the REF scenario, the electricity prices in these 
three countries were the highest. Probably, for these countries it becomes cheaper to  
import from abroad, so that prices decline and supply increases. In the other countries, 
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we see the opposite development. Prices increase and supply decreases in the COMP 
scenario in comparison with the REF scenario.  
Table 5.2 Electricity prices and electricity supply during different load periods for five 
scenarios. 
 Electricity prices (€/MWh) Electricity supply (TWh) 
Region REF COMP STACK STRA CROSS REF COMP STACK STRA CROSS
 Total          
BEL 39.65 26.88 38.07 38.01 33.22 79.2 96.1 83.2 83.3 87.8 
DEN 17.41 18.02 18.46 18.46 18.26 32.9 31.9 31.5 31.5 31.6 
FIN 14.88 15.38 16.90 16.90 16.79 76.4 74.7 71.4 71.4 71.4 
FRA 20.81 13.19 25.65 25.89 25.86 410.7 503.5 363.2 362.3 362.3 
GER 18.19 18.47 23.47 26.11 26.02 477.0 464.0 418.0 399.4 400.0 
NLD 39.65 27.13 34.27 33.71 32.30 100.6 115.6 106.7 107.3 109.0 
NOR 12.25 13.56 15.35 15.35 15.11 110.9 104.6 98.7 98.7 99.3 
SWE 14.26 15.28 17.23 17.23 16.68 135.4 129.0 122.1 122.1 123.9 
EU8 20.62 17.14 24.22 25.07 24.55 1423.0 1519.3 1294.6 1275.8 1285.5 
 Base load period      
BEL 35.69 22.91 38.14 38.14 31.26 59.6 71.1 58.0 58.0 62.8 
DEN 15.67 13.99 14.19 14.19 13.99 18.6 19.3 19.2 19.2 19.3 
FIN 13.39 13.51 15.12 15.12 14.87 56.3 56.1 53.6 53.6 54.0 
FRA 18.73 7.91 22.36 22.85 22.76 267.3 377.4 249.0 246.9 247.2 
GER 16.37 15.13 21.24 24.57 24.46 351.6 362.9 316.9 298.9 299.4 
NLD 35.69 23.89 31.82 31.13 29.85 76.1 85.5 78.7 79.2 80.2 
NOR 11.03 11.83 13.70 13.70 13.42 86.0 83.6 78.9 78.9 79.5 
SWE 12.83 13.00 15.24 15.24 14.60 98.5 98.0 92.0 92.0 93.6 
EU8 18.60 13.38 21.75 22.91 22.24 1014.0 1153.8 946.2 926.6 936.0 
 Peak load period      
BEL 51.67 38.14 37.91 37.73 38.14 19.6 25.1 25.2 25.3 25.1 
DEN 19.69 24.20 25.13 25.13 24.92 14.2 12.6 12.3 12.3 12.4 
FIN 19.04 21.02 22.26 22.26 22.70 20.1 18.6 17.8 17.8 17.5 
FRA 24.69 28.98 32.81 32.39 32.52 143.4 126.1 114.2 115.4 115.0 
GER 23.29 30.47 30.47 30.70 30.67 125.4 101.1 101.1 100.5 100.6 
NLD 52.01 36.35 41.18 40.98 39.12 24.4 30.1 28.0 28.1 28.8 
NOR 16.49 20.46 21.91 21.91 21.92 24.9 20.9 19.8 19.8 19.8 
SWE 18.07 22.48 23.30 23.30 23.08 36.9 31.0 30.1 30.1 30.3 
EU8 25.64 29.02 30.92 30.83 30.75 409.0 365.5 348.5 349.2 349.5 
Note: The average EU8 prices are the domestic market prices weighted by the share of  
 domestic supply in total EU8 supply. 
 
In the other scenarios (STACK, STRA and CROSS), the electricity price is considerably 
higher, and consequently the electricity supply is lower than in the reference scenario. 
The results for the national electricity markets vary slightly. Except for Belgium and the 
Netherlands, the electricity prices increase in all strategic competition scenarios, while 
the supply of electricity declines. For Belgium and the Netherlands, prices decline if 
electricity producers act strategically, which is probably due to the high initial market 
price for electricity (REF scenario). For both countries, market prices in the STACK, 
STRA and CROSS-scenarios are higher than in the COMP scenario.   
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If we compare the average prices in the COMP scenario with those in the STRA  
scenario, we clearly see a general price increase in all national markets in the STRA  
scenario, which indicates that competing firms exercise their market power. This result 
corresponds to our expectation as represented in Figure 4.1. In comparing the STACK 
scenario with STRA, we see that the prices increase in all market except for the German 
market where the leader is situated. The difference between CROSS and STRA is more 
mixed. While the prices go down in relatively small markets of the Benelux, they go up 
in the other 6 markets. This shows that acquisition of passive cross-border ownership  
increases the possibility for executing market power. 
5.1 Load periods 
The EMELIE model distinguishes two load periods as defined in Chapter 2. In the REF 
scenario, the electricity prices for the peak load period are higher than for base load  
period. The prices in the base load period range from €11.03 (Norway) to €35.69 (Bel-
gium and the Netherlands), while the prices range from €16.49 (Norway) to €52.01 (the 
Netherlands) in the peak load period.  
In the case of the COMP scenario, prices in the base load period decline in all countries 
except for Norway, Sweden and Finland. For instance, in Norway, the prices increase 
from €11.03 (REF) to €11.83 (COMP). The explanation is probably that Norwegian, 
Swedish and Finnish market have the lowest initial prices and that companies have an 
incentive to export electricity to countries with higher initial market prices, so that the 
supply for the domestic market has to be satisfied with more expensive peak load  
technologies or with rather expensive imports. Countries such as Belgium and the  
Netherlands realise a relatively large price reduction in the base load periods in the 
COMP scenario in comparison with the REF scenario. Overall, the electricity price in the 
base load period in the COMP scenario is lower than in the REF scenario.  
For the electricity price in the peak load period (COMP scenario) we observe a similar 
development, although next to Norway, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany and  
Sweden, face price increases in the peak load period as well. Moreover, the price  
increases are substantial. Only Belgium and the Netherlands have lower prices, but again 
their initial prices in the REF scenario were considerably higher than in the other  
countries. Moreover, due to cross-border competition the variation of the peak load 
prices between countries is reduced. The remaining variation in peak load prices can be 
attributed to the fact that there are binding constraints (electricity capacity and intercon-
nection capacity).  
With respect to the scenarios dealing with strategically acting firms, the impact of liber-
alisation on the base load prices is ambiguous. In comparison to the STRA scenario, the 
base load prices decline in France and Germany and increase in the Netherlands in the 
STACK scenario, while the prices in the other countries are unaffected. In the STRA 
case, only the base load price in the Netherlands is below the level of the REF scenario. 
Finally, in the CROSS scenario, the base load price of electricity declines for all  
countries in comparison with the STRA scenario.  
In the case of peak load prices, the prices in the strategic competition scenarios increase 
compared to the REF scenario except for Belgium and the Netherlands. However, the 
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reference price in the peak load period is extremely high in both countries. In compari-
son to the STRA scenario, the peak load prices only declines in France and increase in 
the Netherlands, Germany as well as Belgium in the STACK scenario. As for base load 
prices, the prices in the other countries are unaffected. In the CROSS scenario, the peak 
load price of electricity declines for Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, 
while the peak load price increases for Belgium, Finland, France and Norway in  
comparison with the STRA scenario. In the peak load period, prices and supplies show 
little variation between the three strategic competition scenarios (STACK, STRA and 
CROSS). 
5.2 Price decomposition 
In the previous section, we analysed the outcome of the EMELIE base run with the  
market equilibrium prices of electricity in five different scenarios. However, by taking a 
further look at the first order optimality condition of the EMELIE model (equation 
(3.11)), we can conclude that the level of the electricity price in equilibrium is not only 
driven by production costs, but also by on the one hand shadow prices of the different  
restrictions, and on the other hand, the market power executed by strategically acting 
firms. In fact, we can decompose the equilibrium electricity prices according to equation 
(3.11) 
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Hence, the price of electricity in region r during load type l times the market power 
mark-up (ξf,l=0 in COMP) is equal to the marginal cost of production plus the payment 
for capacity plus the trade cost plus the cost of emissions reduction. We call the average 
shadow price of the capacity constraint µi,f,l the capacity payments, because this shadow 
price represents the willingness to invest per technology, firm and load type and it is in a 
way the reserved price for owning the capacity which has been used in production during 
a particular load period.  
In order to undertake a decomposition of the national market prices, we need to consider 
the weighted averages of the marginal production costs, and the shadow prices of capac-
ity, trade and environment. An appropriate weight factor is the amount of production  
minus transmission losses. These data are available at the technology and firm level. 
Table 5.3 presents the result of such decomposition. 
Inspection of Table 5.3 shows that the major share of the average market price comprises 
of the marginal production costs with a share around 2/3rd. The remaining third of the 
price comprises capacity payments and about 3% of the average market price consists of 
trade. This decomposition also provides us with a number of additional insights.  
The marginal production costs increase in Belgium, France and Norway in comparison 
with the COMP scenario, while they increase in the other five national markets. Overall 
the marginal production costs increase somewhat. From this data we draw an interesting 
conclusion, namely that in the case of strategic competition (STACK, STRA, CROSS), 
electricity is not necessarily produced at the places where it is cheapest to do so, but 
firms with market power can distort the market. This distortion is of such a kind that 
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while the total production is lower under the strategic competition scenarios, the total 
average marginal cost has risen above the cost of production under perfect competition.  
Table 5.3 Decomposition of regional equilibrium prices per scenario. 
€/MWh Marginal production cost Capacity payments Trade costs 
Region COMP STACK STRA CROSS COMPSTACK STRA CROSS COMPSTACK STRA CROSS
 Total            
BEL 12.69 14.67 14.96 14.61 10.75 6.13 6.09 6.33 3.43 1.38 1.24 0.71
DEN 9.89 10.16 10.15 9.78 7.76 6.16 6.17 6.42 0.37 0.13 0.13 0.14
FIN 10.57 10.90 10.90 11.10 4.80 3.62 3.62 3.61 0.01 0.18 0.18 0.07
FRA 7.63 12.98 12.92 12.71 5.56 5.20 5.25 5.26 0.00 0.43 0.03 0.00
GER 11.12 10.66 10.95 10.88 7.18 5.52 5.56 5.48 0.18 0.31 0.45 0.54
NLD 17.64 18.54 17.95 18.29 7.64 6.59 7.03 6.15 1.85 2.60 1.65 1.79
NOR 5.93 8.41 8.41 8.19 7.63 5.39 5.39 5.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SWE 4.91 4.05 4.05 4.09 10.37 9.69 9.69 9.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
EU8 9.62 11.42 11.48 11.40 7.10 5.85 5.92 5.85 0.42 0.54 0.38 0.38
 Base load period         
BEL 10.74 15.70 16.13 14.76 8.06 3.32 3.27 3.61 4.10 1.97 1.77 0.00
DEN 6.95 10.00 9.99 9.47 6.61 2.94 2.95 3.30 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00
FIN 9.19 9.68 9.68 9.77 4.31 2.80 2.79 2.84 0.01 0.22 0.22 0.09
FRA 6.57 12.72 12.69 12.56 1.34 2.70 3.08 3.16 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.00
GER 10.67 10.09 10.37 10.31 4.29 3.61 4.02 4.03 0.17 0.28 0.46 0.56
NLD 16.33 17.64 16.85 17.37 5.36 4.70 5.52 4.37 2.19 2.84 1.54 1.80
NOR 5.13 7.49 7.49 7.30 6.70 4.55 4.55 4.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SWE 4.47 2.93 2.93 2.99 8.53 8.66 8.66 8.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
EU8 8.69 10.82 10.87 10.77 4.21 3.95 4.26 4.22 0.48 0.63 0.40 0.34
 Peak load period         
BEL 18.23 12.30 12.26 14.26 18.38 12.61 12.55 13.14 1.53 0.00 0.00 2.50
DEN 14.40 10.40 10.40 10.27 9.51 11.19 11.19 11.29 0.29 0.33 0.33 0.35
FIN 14.73 14.58 14.58 15.22 6.29 6.11 6.11 5.98 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.04
FRA 10.80 13.52 13.42 13.02 18.18 10.64 9.92 9.77 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00
GER 12.72 12.44 12.67 12.58 17.54 11.53 10.13 9.78 0.22 0.42 0.43 0.46
NLD 21.35 21.09 21.04 20.85 14.12 11.91 11.28 11.11 0.88 1.94 1.97 1.78
NOR 9.12 12.09 12.08 11.78 11.34 8.72 8.73 9.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SWE 6.29 7.46 7.46 7.49 16.20 12.82 12.82 13.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
EU8 12.55 13.06 13.09 13.09 16.22 11.01 10.31 10.23 0.25 0.29 0.33 0.47
 
The level of capacity payments is on average lower in the strategic competition scenarios 
than in the case with perfect competition. During base load an increase in the capacity 
payments is found in France and during peak load in Belgium.  
The trade price is relatively easy to explain. There is a big incentive to export to markets 
with relatively high prices like Belgium and The Netherlands. Here we find the highest 
trade prices. In Norway and Sweden the trade price is even zero. Hence, the import  
constraint is never binding in these two countries and this implies that they have a strong 
incentive to sell their locally produced electricity abroad. It is also interesting to see that 
export to France during base load only takes place during the STACK scenario. This 
means that RWE, as market leader, has to find a market to sell the additionally produced 
electricity, increasing the trade price to France, but also to The Netherlands and  
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indirectly to Belgium. Export to the German market becomes a somewhat less attractive 
option. 
While the three shares of marginal production cost, capacity payments and trade add up 
to the equilibrium prices as reported in Table 5.2 for the COMP scenario, this is not the 
case for the STACK, STRA and CROSS scenarios. For these scenarios, the difference 
between the prices in Table 5.2 and the sum of marginal production costs, capacity pay-
ments and the trade costs derived from Table 5.3 are a proxy of the absolute price in-
crease due to the market power in a national electricity market. 
Table 5.4 presents these average market power mark-ups, which corresponds to ξ(ϑ/ε) in 
equation (5.3). 
Table 5.4 Market power mark-up in the EU8 countries per scenario.  
 Total Base load period Peak load period 
Region STACK STRA CROSS STACK STRA CROSS STACK STRA CROSS
BEL 41.7% 41.4% 34.8% 45.0% 44.5% 41.3% 34.3% 34.2% 21.6% 
DEN 10.9% 10.9% 10.5% 8.8% 8.8% 8.7% 12.8% 12.8% 12.1% 
FIN 13.0% 13.0% 11.9% 16.0% 16.0% 14.6% 6.7% 6.7% 6.4% 
FRA 27.4% 29.7% 30.5% 28.2% 31.0% 30.9% 26.3% 27.7% 29.9% 
GER 29.7% 35.1% 35.1% 34.2% 39.6% 39.1% 20.0% 24.3% 25.6% 
NLD 19.1% 21.0% 18.8% 20.9% 23.2% 21.1% 15.2% 16.3% 13.8% 
NOR 10.1% 10.1% 9.4% 12.1% 12.1% 11.3% 5.0% 5.0% 4.7% 
SWE 20.3% 20.3% 17.6% 24.0% 24.0% 21.0% 13.0% 13.0% 11.2% 
EU8 26.4% 29.1% 28.2% 29.2% 32.2% 31.1% 21.2% 23.0% 22.6% 
 
It clearly follows from Table 5.4 that the market power mark-up is on average higher in 
the base load than in the peak load. On the one hand, peak demand requires a large part 
of total production capacity, so that there remains ample room for competition, and on 
the other hand, we assume that elasticities of electricity demand in the peak load period 
are substantially higher than in the base load period. Furthermore, the market power 
mark-up is the highest in Belgium in all scenarios. This illustrates the monopoly position 
of Electrabel in Belgium. The monopolist in France (EdF) has the second highest market 
power mark-up during peak load, while the market power mark-up of Germany is second 
highest during base load, which also ranks Germany as the second highest overall. The 
Danish and Norwegian markets are the closest to perfect competition, with a market 
power mark-up of only 10%. 
5.3 Individual firms 
Table 5.5 shows the resulting discounted payoff per firm in million Euros. From Table 
5.5 we can see that the leader (RWE) has an 11% higher payoff in STACK than in 
STRA, while other firms in Germany have substantially lower payoffs. This indicates 
that there is a first mover advantage when RWE is the market leader, but also that the  
reduction in market power mark-up is large (see also Table 5.5 for the ξ factor of the 
leader under base and peak load).  
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Table 5.5  Payoff and marginal costs per firm (Million euros) for five different  
scenarios 
 Payoff: (Meuro/year) Average marginal cost (€/MWh) 
Firm REF COMP STACK STRA CROSS COMP STACK STRA CROSS 
FrinBEL 189 99 205 204 154 27.36 38.09 38.06 32.72 
ElectBEL 1,627 1,045 1,168 1,168 1,185 12.55 10.30 10.53 11.34 
FrinDEN 85 86 92 92 89 17.71 16.38 16.38 16.27 
ElsamE2 104 175 234 276 273 12.45 12.51 12.53 12.51 
FrinFIN 156 195 238 238 237 15.72 17.22 17.22 17.20 
Fortum 208 230 238 238 242 7.43 5.66 5.66 6.14 
PVO 87 106 116 116 113 8.37 6.70 6.70 6.68 
FrinFRA 106 238 728 753 750 23.85 24.64 24.93 24.89 
EDF 5,678 3,320 5,401 5,702 5,560 6.80 6.70 6.70 6.70 
FrinGER 175 263 445 547 543 18.67 24.07 26.59 26.51 
EnBW 564 587 863 975 953 8.98 9.05 9.06 9.07 
EONGER 1,281 1,157 1,548 1,872 1,902 9.88 7.58 9.18 9.35 
VattenGER 628 697 1,070 1,317 1,291 11.63 11.27 11.86 11.86 
RWE 990 1,220 2,131 1,918 1,876 11.20 12.18 10.53 10.46 
FrinNLD 563 298 474 460 426 26.38 33.69 33.10 31.71 
ElectNLD 256 118 233 229 183 21.49 22.35 22.37 22.36 
NUON 320 150 262 259 213 17.84 16.98 17.00 16.80 
EONNLD 194 82 190 187 142 19.63 20.27 20.29 20.21 
Essent 598 291 459 427 373 16.96 15.65 15.89 15.92 
FrinNOR 549 616 697 697 687 13.59 15.38 15.38 15.16 
Statkraft 474 534 603 603 588 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
OsloEn 121 136 153 153 150 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NorskHy 99 112 126 126 123 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Agder 99 107 120 120 117 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BKK 108 100 111 111 109 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Lyse 89 98 108 108 106 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
FrinSWE 62 98 116 116 111 15.90 17.70 17.70 ‘7.19 
VattenSWE 655 746 754 767 759 4.91 4.10 4.10 4.25 
Sydkraft 192 257 287 287 277 5.65 5.70 5.70 5.70 
Birka 171 200 224 224 216 5.43 4.86 4.86 4.87 
FortumK 55 71 82 82 79 3.58 3.56 3.56 3.56 
Skellefte 39 38 43 43 41 2.86 2.82 2.82 2.83 
Graninge 32 35 39 39 38 1.30 1.29 1.29 1.30 
All firms 16,551 13,503 19,556 20,455 19,901 9.62 11.42 11.48 11.40 
Note: The average marginal costs are weighed by the number of load hours, actual production 
 minus transmissions losses. ξRWE,base=0.439; ξRWE,peak=0.000. 
5.4 Environment 
The EMELIE model can also measure the environmental impacts of different firm be-
haviours. In the REF scenario, the levels of emissions are 442 Mton CO2 equivalents, 
1,078 kton acid equivalents, and 2,871 kton PM10 emissions. The effect of different 
market behaviour scenarios on greenhouse gas, acidifying and smog emissions relative 
to the reference scenario is presented in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1 Changes in levels of emissions under different scenarios of producer  
behaviour. 
Figure 5.1 shows that the difference in emissions with respect to the reference scenario 
point in the same direction for each pollutant for the STRA and STACK scenarios. The 
effect in the COMP and CROSS scenario is mixed. Under full competition or with cross-
ownership relations, greenhouse gas emissions decline compared to the initial situation, 
while acidification and smog formation increase.  
Let us consider the effect of firm behaviour on greenhouse gas emissions. It turns out 
that the reduction in the level of greenhouse gas emissions is the highest in the STRA 
scenario. As in the STRA scenario, greenhouse gas emissions are also lower in the 
COMP and CROSS scenarios as compared to the REF scenario. The main reason is that 
the level of electricity supply in these scenarios is much lower than in the REF scenario. 
The level of greenhouse gas emissions in the STACK scenario even increases with re-
spect to the reference scenario. This is caused by the extra production of RWE, which is 
realised with an additional production with carbon-intensive lignite. Table 5.6 shows that 
the total production with lignite goes up in the STACK scenario to 85% of total capacity 
from 58% of total capacity in the STRA scenario. 
Table 5.6 presents the use of technologies in the load periods. In the REF scenario,  
almost all technologies are fully used during the peak period, while the technology mix 
in the base load period shows a large variation. A similar trend is found for the COMP 
scenario. Due to the fact that the peak load supply in the COMP scenario is lower than in 
the REF scenario, the technologies Gas and CHP oil are not fully used. The higher base 
load supply in the COMP scenario is produced with the carbon-intensive technologies 
Coal and Lignite that show higher shares in the COMP scenario than in the REF  
scenario.  
In the STACK scenario, the share of Lignite is 85% in the base load period, while the 
share of lignite in the STRA scenario is 58%. Recall that the main technology of RWE, 
the price leader in our STACK scenario, is Lignite, so that the technology results  
indicate the market power of RWE as well. 
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Table 5.6 Use of technology of firms per region under base and peak load. 
 REF COMP STACK STRA CROSS 
Technology Base Peak base peak base peak base peak base peak 
Nuclear 81% 100% 100% 100% 59% 100% 59% 100% 59% 100% 
Coal 43% 100% 54% 100% 48% 82% 51% 82% 50% 82% 
Lignite 73% 100% 72% 100% 85% 100% 58% 100% 68% 100% 
Gas 0% 100% 0% 51% 8% 63% 8% 65% 7% 65% 
Oil 0% 56% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
CHP-gas 81% 100% 78% 100% 87% 100% 87% 100% 89% 100% 
CHP-coal 100% 100% 100% 100% 97% 100% 97% 100% 97% 100% 
CHP-oil 0% 100% 9% 46% 0% 46% 0% 46% 0% 46% 
CHP-bio 0% 100% 35% 100% 20% 50% 24% 50% 24% 50% 
CHP-others 0% 100% 0% 100% 72% 99% 72% 99% 72% 99% 
Hydro 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Wind 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
In the peak load period, the results do not differ because the Lignite technology capacity 
is fully used. The results in the table also indicate that in the STACK, STRA and CROSS 
scenarios carbon-intensive technologies, such as Coal, are used less in peak load  
production, while ‘clean’ technologies, such as CHP others, are used more in base load 
production. 
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6. Sensitivity analysis 
In order to assess whether the EMELIE model produces robust and reasonable results, 
we apply a sensitivity analysis. A number of key parameters are evaluated, such as the 
level of the price elasticity of the demand (ELASTIC), the ratio of price elasticities of 
base load and peak load demand (ELASTEQ), transmission losses (LAMBDA), distribu-
tion of peak load and base load demand (PEAKBASE), uniform electricity prices 
(UNIFORM) and trade options (TRANSM). We particularly focus attention on what the 
impact of model parameters is on the performance of national electricity markets in 
terms of market prices and electricity demand. Issues such as (de-)mergers and emission 
restrictions are beyond the scope of this sensitivity analysis. However, we consider two 
environmental scenarios (ENVIRON) as well. In the first of these ENVIRON scenarios, 
prices of emission permits from emission trading enter explicitly in the model as costs of 
production. In the second scenario, we assume that policy makers impose a binding  
restriction on GHG emission reduction of 10%. For all these sensitivity analyses, we 
consider the five scenarios REF, COMP, STRA, STACK and CROSS as in Chapter 5.  
6.1 Transmission losses (LAMBDA) 
Transmission losses, i.e. the parameters λr,r* in the EMELIE model in Chapter 3, are the 
differences between production output and actual supply. According to Table 2.4,  
transmission losses differ across countries, where the transmission losses increase with 
the size of a country. Due to these characteristics of transmission losses, we evaluate  
alternative values in order to measure the impact on producer behaviour in the EU8  
electricity market. In the STACK scenario, RWE remains the market leader, although the 
market power mark-ups of RWE are recalculated: ξbase = 0.434 and ξpeak = 0.270 in the 
case of lower transmission losses, and ξbase = 0.458 and ξpeak = 0.506 for higher transmis-
sion losses.  
In particular, the impacts of transmission losses are evaluated by imposing a 25%  
increase and a 25% decrease on transmission losses. In general, the average electricity 
prices under all scenarios decrease due to lower transmission losses and increase due to 
higher transmission losses. In comparison with the results from the initially calibrated 
model in Table 5.2, the price in the COMP scenario declines from € 16.73 to € 16.48 due 
to lower transmission losses (–1.3%), and increases to € 16.94 due to higher transmission 
losses (1.3%). The other scenarios except the REF scenario show the similar trend for 
the average price as well for the base load and peak load price.  
At the national level, which is not presented in the table, a similar trend is observed,  
although there is one exception. Under full competition, the electricity price in Norway 
slightly increases with lower transmission losses, and decreases with higher transmission 
losses. This is caused by changes in the imports of cheap nuclear energy from Sweden in 
this scenario. If transmission losses are higher, producers in Sweden are less willing to 
produce for the Norwegian electricity consumers, which is due to the high transmission 
losses in the Sweden and Norway.  
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As prices increase with the level of transmission losses, the demand for electricity, emis-
sions and payoffs all decrease with the level of transmission losses. In general, the 
EMELIE model is robust for changes in the level of transmission losses. Note that varia-
tions in the transmission losses affect the utilisation ratio of production capacity in the 
REF scenario. Lower transmission losses lower the burden on production capacity. 
Table 6.1 The EU8 electricity market for different scenarios with variation in the 
transmission losses. 
 Transmission losses –25% Transmission losses +25% 
Region REF COMP STACK STRA CROSS REF COMP STACK STRA CROSS
Price           
Average 20.62 16.75 23.55 24.41 23.92 20.62 17.47 24.83 25.73 25.22
Base 18.60 12.99 21.10 22.27 21.64 18.60 13.66 22.33 23.52 22.85
Peak 25.64 28.62 30.15 30.03 29.96 25.64 29.58 31.67 31.67 31.63
Demand           
Total 1423.0 1537.5 1313.4 1294.0 1303.0 1423.0 1503.4 1278.1 1258.7 1267.6
Base 1014.0 1168.1 958.1 937.5 946.3 1014.0 1143.3 936.1 916.7 925.7
Peak 409.0 369.4 355.3 356.5 356.7 409.0 360.0 342.0 342.0 341.9
Utilization           
Total 66% 71% 62% 61% 61% 68% 72% 63% 62% 62% 
Base 59% 68% 56% 55% 56% 61% 68% 57% 56% 57% 
Peak 94% 85% 84% 84% 84% 97% 86% 84% 84% 84% 
Emissions           
GHG eq 
(mt) 423.3 434.0 449.4 422.9 429.8 455.2 447.4 465.0 438.0 448.1 
Acid (10 
kt) 102.3 107.6 113.8 106.6 108.9 110.9 111.4 119.1 111.9 115.0 
Pm10 (10 
kt) 275.0 290.0 299.1 278.5 284.0 293.6 294.4 311.3 290.5 299.5 
Payoffs           
Total 17,022 13,358 19,292 20,208 19,674 16,066 13,573 19,731 20,676 20,151 
RWE 1,078 1,200 2,106 1,892 1,850 997 1,347 2,148 1,948 1,905 
Note:  The average EU8 prices are the domestic market prices weighted by the share of  
 domestic supply in total EU8 supply. For RWE in the STACK scenario with lower 
 transmission losses, ξbase = 0.414 and ξpeak = 0 (lower bound) and with higher  
 transmission losses, ξbase = 0.443 and ξpeak = 0.771. 
6.2 Alternative division of peak and base load periods (PEAKBASE) 
The division of peak load and base load demand is rather arbitrary. Therefore, we evalu-
ate the EMELIE model with respect to the assumption imposed on the share of capacity 
used in peak load periods, and on the share of the peak load price in the average price. In 
contrast with the division as presented in Section 2.1, we first assume that peak load de-
mand in a region requires 80% (instead of 90%) of total available capacity. Secondly, we 
return to the initial model, and we impose the assumption that the peak price is 80%  
(instead of 90%) of the average price. Finally, we run the model in which both assump-
tions are imposed simultaneously.  
The first assumption lowers the level of the peak demand, and this will have a downward 
effect on the electricity prices in peak load periods. The second assumption lowers the 
level of base load price levels, so that the peak load price will increase due to the defini-
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tion in Section 2. If we impose both restrictions, the effect on the electricity market is 
ambiguous. 
If the ratio peak demand over maximum production capacity is reduced from 90% to 
80%, the REF scenario shows lower peak demand (409.0 TWH initially, see Table 5.2, 
and now 363.5 TWh) at higher prices (€25.64 initially and now €26.54). This is due to 
the calculation rules in Section 2.2, as peak demand declines, while the share of the peak 
price in the average price remains unchanged. However, under different scenarios of 
producer behaviour in a liberalised market, the electricity prices in peak load periods de-
cline due to the lower level of peak demand. On the other hand, prices in base load de-
mand slightly increase for the COMP, STACK, STRA and CROSS scenarios, while the 
level of base demand increase as well. As a result, the average electricity prices under 
the COMP and STACK scenario decrease, while they decrease in the STRA and the 
CROSS scenarios. Total electricity demand increases slightly for all scenarios (except 
the REF scenario). Obviously, the utilisation of production capacity in the peak load pe-
riod is lower. 
Table 6.2 EU 8 electricity market under different peak-base load assumptions for five 
scenarios. 
 
Peak demand is 80% of maximum  
capacity Peak price is 80% of average price 
Region REF COMP STACK STRA CROSS REF COMP STACK STRA CROSS
Price           
Average 20.62 16.81 23.82 24.66 24.15 20.62 17.63 25.04 26.11 25.76
Base 18.60 13.95 22.29 23.38 22.74 16.53 12.60 21.04 22.35 21.75
Peak 26.54 26.17 28.26 28.26 28.15 30.77 32.31 35.10 35.40 35.88
Demand           
Total 1423.0 1542.0 1319.3 1300.6 1310.2 1423.0 1517.4 1280.2 1255.8 1259.5
Base 1059.5 1181.0 978.9 960.2 969.1 1014.0 1130.0 916.3 894.4 902.3
Peak 363.5 361.1 340.4 340.4 341.2 409.0 387.4 363.9 361.4 357.2
Utilization           
Total 67% 73% 63% 63% 63% 67% 71% 61% 60% 61%
Base 62% 69% 59% 58% 58% 60% 67% 55% 54% 54%
Peak 85% 85% 82% 82% 82% 96% 91% 87% 87% 86%
Emissions           
GHG eq (mt) 449.3 466.9 474.3 445.3 455.5 442.1 426.1 444.8 416.2 419.7 
Acid (10 kt) 111.6 116.1 122.1 113.6 117.4 107.8 104.9 112.6 105.3 106.6 
Pm10 (10 kt) 301.2 307.7 320.0 295.7 305.9 287.1 278.2 299.3 279.3 278.4 
Payoffs           
Total 17,597 13,068 19,420 20,327 19,775 16,551 13,903 20,293 21,436 21,061 
RWE 1,371 1,108 2,120 1,929 1,890 996 1,222 2,179 1,978 1,967 
Note:  The average EU8 prices are the domestic market prices weighted by the share of  
 domestic supply in total EU8 supply. For RWE in the STACK scenario if peak demand 
 is 80% of maximum capacity ξbase = 0.467 and ξpeak = 1.000 (upper bound). If the peak 
 price accounts for 80% of the average price, ξbase = 0.317 and ξpeak = 0.125. 
 
If the peak load price accounts for 80% of the average price instead of 90%, the demand 
in the REF scenario remains unchanged at 409.0 TWH, while the base load price of elec-
tricity decreases from €18.60 in the initial model to €16.53 and the peak load price in-
creases from €25.64 to €32.56. The base load prices in the other scenarios hardly change 
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despite the lower base load price in the REF scenario. The higher peak load price in the 
REF scenario is observed in the other scenarios as well. The peak load demands in all 
scenarios are higher as well. 
Consequently, the peak load demand in the REF scenario decreases by 10% in compari-
son with the initial calibration. From the table, we see a similar development of higher 
peak load prices and lower levels of peak load demand for all other scenarios. 
Unlike the initial calibration, the peak load prices in Belgium exceed the base load prices 
for all five scenarios in this alternative.  
Finally, we combine both alternative assumptions discussed above. In this third alterna-
tive, the ratio peak demand over maximum production capacity is reduced from 90% to 
80%, and the peak load price accounts for 80% of the average price instead of 90%. 
Table 6.3 shows the results. In the REF scenario, the ratio of base and peak load prices is 
as under the first alternative, and the ratio of base and peak load demand is as under the 
second alternative. 
Table 6.3 EU 8 electricity market under different peak-base load assumptions for five 
scenarios. 
 
Peak demand is 80% of maximum capacity 
and peak price is 80% of average price 
Absolute values 
Peak demand is 80% of maximum capacity 
and peak price is 80% of average price 
Index (initial model) 
Region REF COMP STACK STRA CROSS REF COMP STACK STRA CROSS
Price           
Average 20.62 17.57 24.87 25.73 25.20 100.0 102.5 102.7 102.6 102.6
Base 16.53 13.41 21.76 22.88 22.20 88.9 100.2 100.0 99.9 99.8
Peak 32.56 30.24 33.20 33.20 33.18 127.0 104.2 107.4 107.7 107.9
Demand           
Total 1423.0 1527.5 1296.5 1277.5 1287.1 100.0 100.5 100.1 100.1 100.1
Base 1059.5 1149.4 944.4 925.4 935.1 104.5 99.6 99.8 99.9 99.9
Peak 363.5 378.1 352.2 352.1 352.0 88.9 103.5 101.1 100.8 100.7
Utilization           
Total 67% 72% 62% 61% 62% 100.0 100.5 100.2 100.1 100.1
Base 62% 68% 57% 56% 56% 104.3 99.6 99.8 99.9 99.9
Peak 85% 89% 85% 85% 85% 89.1 103.4 101.1 100.8 100.7
Emissions           
GHG eq (mt) 449.3 445.3 454.5 431.1 438.8 101.6 101.2 99.7 100.9 100.4
Acid (10 kt) 111.6 110.5 115.1 109.0 111.8 103.5 101.3 99.6 101.4 100.9
pm10 (10 kt) 301.2 295.1 301.5 284.3 290.5 104.9 100.9 99.4 101.6 100.5
Payoffs           
Total 17,597 13,993 20,379 21,285 20,727 106.3 103.6 104.2 104.1 104.1
RWE 1,297 1,220 2,216 2,002 1,963 131.0 100.1 104.0 104.4 104.6
Note:  The average EU8 prices are the domestic market prices weighted by the share of  
 domestic supply in total EU8 supply. For RWE in the STACK scenario, ξbase =0.428 and 
 ξpeak = 0.467. 
 
Due to this alternative division rules between peak and base, the level of prices increased 
ranging from 2.1% in the STRA scenario to 2.7% in the COMP scenario. At the same 
time, the total demand increased as well by 0.5% for all scenarios (except the REF  
scenario). Peak load prices are substantially higher ranging from 4–6% across scenarios, 
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while peak demand increased by 2–3%. For the base load prices and demand levels, only 
minor changes were observed. 
6.3 Uniform prices (UNIFORM) 
The liberalisation of the electricity market resolves the market access barriers. Ulti-
mately, if there would be no physical restriction left, we expect the electricity market of 
the EU8 to clear at one unique price. However, there are still physical constraints due to 
transmission capacity and production capacity. Impacts of these barriers can be assessed 
by calibration of the EMELIE model with a uniform reference price. Table 6.4 shows 
that in the REF scenario, the average price is equal for all countries. The differences in 
the peak load prices are due to the assumptions on the peak load price as discussed in 
Chapter 5.  
In the COMP scenario, the average price declines by 2.7% and the demand increases by 
3.4% compared to the initial calibration. In the scenarios with strategic behaviour of 
electricity producers, a uniform initial prices leads to higher average electricity prices. 
Despite these higher prices, the demand level increases as well for the scenarios STACK, 
STRA and CROSS. 
Table 6.4 Electricity prices and electricity supply during different load periods for five 
scenarios assuming uniform initial prices. 
 Absolute values Index (initial model) 
 REF COMP STACK STRA CROSS REF COMP STACK STRA CROSS
Price           
Average 20.62 16.55 25.23 25.98 25.36 100.0 96.6 104.2 103.6 103.3 
Base 18.56 12.68 22.96 23.96 23.13 99.8 94.8 105.6 104.6 104.0 
Peak 25.73 29.09 31.35 31.35 31.34 100.4 100.2 101.4 101.7 101.9 
Demand           
Total 1423.0 1554.8 1283.7 1267.3 1275.6 100.0 102.3 99.2 99.3 99.2 
Base 1014.0 1188.2 936.6 920.2 928.5 100.0 103.0 99.0 99.3 99.2 
Peak 409.0 366.6 347.0 347.0 347.1 100.0 100.3 99.6 99.4 99.3 
Utilization           
Total 67% 73% 61% 61% 61% 99.7 102.0 98.7 98.9 98.8 
Base 59% 70% 56% 55% 55% 99.5 102.6 98.5 98.8 98.7 
Peak 96% 86% 83% 83% 83% 100.0 100.1 99.3 99.1 99.1 
Emissions           
GHG eq 
(mt) 471.3 461.9 442.7 425.6 429.9 106.6 105.0 97.1 99.6 98.3 
Acid (10 kt) 118.2 115.2 114.8 110.8 111.8 109.6 105.6 99.3 103.1 100.9 
Pm10 (10 kt) 322.5 309.0 299.7 288.2 290.9 112.3 105.7 98.8 103.0 100.6 
Payoffs           
Total 16,081 12,414 20,743 21,523 20,829 97.2 91.9 106.1 105.2 104.7 
RWE 1,000 1,168 2,045 1,870 1,823 101.0 95.7 96.0 97.5 97.2 
Note:  The average EU8 prices are the domestic market prices weighted by the share of  
 domestic supply in total EU8 supply. For RWE in the STACK scenario: A: ξbase = 0.075 
 and ξpeak = 0.130. 
 
Although not shown in the table, even in the COMP scenario there are already differ-
ences in electricity prices across different national markets. Especially, the prices of 
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electricity in France, Norway and Finland, i.e. the countries with cheap production tech-
nologies such as nuclear power and hydropower, are low. Net importers or countries re-
lying on more expensive technologies show higher electricity prices.  
As Table 6.4 shows, we observe a similar pattern for the base load period. In the peak 
load period, electricity prices are at a substantially higher level, and the prices are not 
uniform over countries although there is limited variation in electricity prices across na-
tional electricity markets. In base load period, the average electricity price of the EU8 
declines for the COMP scenario in comparison with the REF scenario, while in the peak 
load period we observe the reverse case.  
The example of the uniform initial prices clearly shows the complexity of interactions at 
play in a liberalised electricity market. Even if we take a uniform electricity price as a 
starting point, the combination of restrictions on electricity capacity and trade, and stra-
tegic behaviour causes price differences on national markets. Note, however, that the 
variation in prices decreases if we start with a uniform price.  
6.4 Price elasticities of demand 
In our initial EMELIE model, we use a base load elasticity of –0.4 and we assume that 
the peak load elasticity is twice the base load elasticity (i.e. –0.8). We verify our price 
elasticities in two dimensions. First, we evaluate the ratio of price elasticities between 
peak period and base period. We assume a more elastic peak period demand, but we as-
sess the model when the base period and peak period elasticities are equal. We then 
maintain possible geographical differences in price elasticities. Note that we ignore the 
case that price elasticities for peak load demand are smaller than those for base load de-
mand, simply because it seems unrealistic. Secondly, we evaluate the level of the elastic-
ities given the more elastic demand for electricity in the peak period. We rerun the 
EMELIE model by decreasing and increasing the level of price elasticities by 25%. The 
different sets of alternative elasticities are summarized in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5 Price elasticities of the demand for electricity per load periods. 
 Ratio of peak and base load elasticities 
Level of elasticities Peak = base Peak > base 
Low   –0.6; –0.3 
Medium  –0.4; –0.4 –0.8; –0.4 
High   –1.0; –0.5 
Note:  For Denmark and the Netherlands the base load elasticities are –0.295 and –0.29  
 respectively. 
 
In the EMELIE model we assume that electricity demand is represented by a simple CES 
demand function, which depends on three parameters, reference demand, reference price, 
and the price elasticity. Note that we distinguish different demand functions per country 
and per load period. First, we evaluate similar price elasticities for peak and base load 
demand, and then we evaluate price elasticities by varying the level of elasticities.  
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6.4.1 Similar price elasticities for peak and base load demand (ELASEQ) 
Table 6.6 presents the results of the EMELIE model in the case that the price elasticities 
of the peak load periods are equal to those of the base load periods. In fact, we assume 
that the peak demand elasticity is less elastic than in the initial case. From Table 6.6, we 
can see that there are only minor changes in the prices and demands in the base load pe-
riods. For all scenarios, the electricity price in the peak load period increases. In the 
COMP scenario, the price increases by 1.5%, while in the STACK, STRA and CROSS 
scenarios the prices increase by approximately 10%. The demand in these scenarios de-
creases by less than 1%, while the amount of emissions slightly increases. The payoffs 
increase by 13–14% in these scenarios.  
In the peak load period, we observe substantially higher levels of electricity prices when 
electricity producers act strategically (STRA, STACK or CROSS scenario). The average 
peak load price in the EU8 increases by approximately 30%, while the total demand for 
electricity during peak load period only declines by roughly 4% in the scenarios STRA, 
STACK and CROSS.  
Although it is not shown in the Table 6.6, there are many forces at play at the national 
and international level of the electricity market, if we assume similar price elasticities of 
demand in base and peak load period. These dynamics largely depend on the circum-
stances. We conclude that less elastic demands opens opportunities for electricity  
producers to act strategically.  
Table 6.6 EU8 electricity market when price elasticities of peak and base load demand 
are similar for five scenarios assuming. 
 Absolute values Index (initial model) 
 REF COMP STACK STRA CROSS REF COMP STACK STRA CROSS
Price           
Average 20.62 17.49 26.88 27.82 27.19 100.0 102.0 111.0 111.0 110.8 
Base 18.60 13.38 21.74 22.91 22.24 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Peak 25.64 30.02 41.30 41.34 40.94 100.0 103.4 133.6 134.1 133.1 
Demand           
Total 1423.0 1532.4 1282.9 1263.2 1273.1 100.0 100.9 99.1 99.0 99.0 
Base 1014.0 1153.8 946.2 926.6 936.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Peak 409.0 378.5 336.6 336.6 337.2 100.0 103.6 96.6 96.4 96.5 
Utilization           
Total 67% 72% 62% 61% 61% 100.0 100.8 99.1 99.1 99.1 
Base 60% 68% 57% 56% 56% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Peak 96% 89% 81% 81% 81% 100.0 103.5 96.8 96.6 96.7 
Emissions           
GHG eq (mt) 442.1 443.5 461.1 432.9 444.8 100.0 100.8 101.1 101.3 101.7 
Acid (10 kt) 107.8 109.1 117.3 109.5 113.9 100.0 100.0 101.5 101.9 102.8 
Pm10 (10 kt) 287.1 291.0 311.4 288.9 300.9 100.0 99.5 102.7 103.3 104.1 
Payoffs           
Total 16,551 13,887 22,458 23,403 22,754 100.0 102.8 114.8 114.4 114.3 
RWE 990 1,215 2,494 2,256 2,247 100.0 99.6 117.0 117.6 119.8 
Note:  The average EU8 prices are the domestic market prices weighted by the share of  
 domestic supply in total EU8 supply. For RWE in the STACK scenario: ξbase =0.429 and 
 ξpeak = 0.507. 
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6.4.2 Varying the level of elasticities of demand (ELASTIC) 
We return to our original calibration of the EMELIE model in which the ratio of price 
elasticity of peak load demand versus base load demand as in the initial model is re-
stored. Now, we vary the level of price elasticities of electricity demand. First, we as-
sume a less elastic electricity demand, and then we assume a more elastic electricity de-
mand. In both cases, we alter the level of price elasticities by 25%.  
On average, the electricity price slightly declines with the absolute value of the price 
elasticity of demand in the COMP scenario. In the scenarios with strategic behaviour of 
electricity producers, it is the other way around. In STACK, STRA and CROSS, the 
level of the electricity prices decrease with the absolute level of the price elasticity for 
electricity. Subsequently, the level of demands decline as the price level rises. However, 
Table 6.7 shows that firms can realise much higher payoffs whenever the demands for 
electricity are rather price inelastic. The higher prices overcompensate the reduction in 
demand. In the case of less elastic electricity demand, electricity producers can exercise 
more market power altogether. 
Table 6.7 EU 8 electricity market when electricity demand is less or more elastic for 
five scenarios. 
 Less price elastic demand More price elastic demand 
 REF COMP STACK STRA CROSS REF COMP STACK STRA CROSS
Price           
Average 20.62 16.77 28.25 29.14 28.05 20.62 17.44 22.16 23.06 22.88
Base 18.60 12.69 26.58 27.78 26.30 18.60 13.95 19.33 20.54 20.26
Peak 25.64 29.29 32.61 32.62 32.60 25.64 28.53 30.28 29.99 30.18
Demand           
Total 1423.0 1509.9 1262.7 1250.4 1260.3 1423.0 1525.3 1328.8 1302.7 1306.1
Base 1014.0 1138.3 912.9 900.7 910.8 1014.0 1161.0 984.5 955.1 960.9
Peak 409.0 371.6 349.7 349.7 349.5 409.0 364.4 344.3 347.6 345.2
Utilization           
Total 67% 71% 61% 60% 61% 67% 72% 64% 63% 63% 
Base 60% 67% 55% 54% 55% 60% 68% 59% 57% 58% 
Peak 96% 87% 84% 84% 84% 96% 86% 83% 83% 83% 
Emissions           
GHG eq (mt) 442.1 438.8 463.4 433.2 442.4 442.1 445.6 441.6 414.2 419.3 
Acid (10 kt) 107.8 108.3 121.6 112.5 115.3 107.8 110.4 111.3 104.4 106.4 
Pm10 (10 kt) 287.1 289.0 312.3 282.3 290.1 287.1 294.4 292.2 275.7 279.7 
Payoffs           
Total 16,551 12,757 23,846 24,591 23,386 16,551 13,924 17,632 18,583 18,425
RWE 990 1,196 2,790 2,268 2,259 990 1,192 1,765 1,628 1,598
Note:  The average EU8 prices are the domestic market prices weighted by the share of  
 domestic supply in total EU8 supply. For RWE in the STACK scenario if the demand is 
 less price elastic: ξbase = 0.435 and ξpeak = 0.250, and more elastic: ξbase = 0 (lower limit) 
 and ξpeak = 0.056. 
 
Moreover, the developments observed for the whole EU8 electricity market when vary-
ing the levels of price elasticity also hold for the separate markets in peak and base load 
periods. Again, although not shown in the table, the underlying results of firms an na-
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tional electricity markets indicate that there are a lot of dynamics (exports and imports) 
going on national markets a well as on the international market.  
6.5 Transmission capacity (TRANSM) 
In the initial calibration of the EMELIE model, there are transmission capacities between 
countries are included. In the formation of one large European electricity market, these 
transmission capacities can be restrictive. In order to evaluate their role in the results of 
the EMELIE model, we rerun the EMELIE model for two extreme cases. First, we re-
duce the possibility of trading by minimizing the transmission capacity to zero. All indi-
vidual EU8 countries have to supply their own domestic demand for electricity. The 
electricity price is therefore largely driven by the available production technologies in a 
country. We expect large differences in prices across countries. Secondly, we assume 
that there are no transmission restrictions anymore. Neighbouring countries have large 
opportunities to trade. We expect that the price differences between countries of most 
scenarios will be much smaller due tot the increased possibilities to compete, particularly 
for the full competition scenario (COMP).   
Table 6.8 EU8 electricity market with reduced and full transmission capacity for five 
scenarios. 
 Reduced transmission Full transmission 
 REF COMP STACK STRA CROSS REF COMP STACK STRA CROSS
Price           
Average 20.62 16.55 25.23 25.98 25.36 20.62 18.25 22.94 23.99 23.82
Base 18.60 12.68 22.96 23.96 23.13 18.60 14.66 20.01 21.36 21.15
Peak 25.64 29.09 31.35 31.35 31.34 25.64 28.99 31.18 31.21 31.19
Demand           
Total 1423.0 1554.8 1283.7 1267.3 1275.6 1423.0 1454.1 1313.9 1290.8 1293.7
Base 1014.0 1188.2 936.6 920.2 928.5 1014.0 1090.3 969.8 946.6 949.5
Peak 409.0 366.6 347.0 347.0 347.1 409.0 363.8 344.1 344.2 344.2
Utilization           
Total 67% 73% 61% 61% 61% 67% 69% 63% 62% 62% 
Base 59% 70% 56% 55% 55% 60% 65% 59% 57% 57% 
Peak 96% 86% 83% 83% 83% 96% 86% 83% 83% 83% 
Emissions           
GHG eq (mt) 471.27 461.9 446.4 425.6 428.5 330.2 383.4 472.3 435.9 441.6 
Acid (10 kt) 118.2 115.2 116.4 110.8 111.2 78.3 91.6 123.2 112.8 115.0 
Pm10 (10 kt) 322.5 309.0 304.2 288.2 289.1 215.9 255.4 323.9 294.6 302.4 
Payoffs           
Total 16,081 12,414 20,743 21,523 20,829 17,473 15,043 18,233 19,378 19,207 
RWE 1,000 1,168 2,045 1,870 1,823 1,029 1,091 1,757 1,562 1,530 
Note:  The average EU8 prices are the domestic market prices weighted by the share of  
 domestic supply in total EU8 supply. For RWE in the STACK scenario with reduced 
 transmission is ξbase = 0.470 and ξpeak = 1.000 (upper bound), and under full transmission 
 is ξbase = 0.329 and ξpeak = 0.134. 
 
Table 6.8 presents the results of the EU8 electricity market when there are reduced and 
full transmission capacities between neighbouring countries. In the COMP scenario, the 
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electricity price declines in the case of reduced transmission and increases in the case of 
full transmission, which is rather counterintuitive. 
However, the EU8 market has a number of countries like France, Norway and Sweden 
which have sufficient production capacities of cheap technologies. Since transmission is 
reduced, there are less incentives to export electricity to countries with high electricity 
prices. So the electricity prices in these countries remain low, and they account for a sub-
stantial part of the average EU8 price. In the case of full competition, this reasoning can 
be reversed.  
Furthermore, Table 6.8 shows that more trade opportunities imply lower prices in an 
electricity market with strategically acting electricity producers. Although more electric-
ity is demanded under the full transmission market alternative compared to reduced 
transmission market alternative, the higher demands do not compensate for the lower 
electricity prices. In a reduced transmission market, the total amounts of payoffs are sub-
stantially higher. In that case, exercising market power pays off.  
6.6 Environmental constraints (ENVIRON) 
To study the effect of environmental constraints on the model, we define emission re-
strictions as a fraction of the level of emissions in the reference situation, where the mar-
ket is being served by minimising the cost of production. While we assume that there are 
no restrictions in the model for acidifying emissions and fine particles (PM10), we do 
study restrictions on greenhouse gas.  
In the first scenario on the emissions, we assume that the level of greenhouse gas emis-
sions with respect to the level in the reference case (representative for the year 2000) has 
to be reduced with 10%. While the Kyoto target translates into a reduction of 2.3% with 
respect to the level of emissions in 2000 in the eight studied countries, it is reasonable to 
assume that the electricity sector contributes more, as there is a large potential to do so at 
a relatively low cost. In that sense, the 10% reduction target makes sense. 
Alternatively, it is also possible to run the EMELIE model with a simplified tradable 
permit system in place. In the second scenario, the implied level of greenhouse gas emis-
sion reductions is calculated with a permit price of €5 per tonne carbon equivalent. Then 
the shadow price κghg is no longer a variable, but fixed at €5 per tonne carbon equivalent. 
The emission constraint in equation (3.8) is no longer part of the model, but the induced 
level of reduction can be derived ex post after the model run.  
Table 6.9 shows the summary results of the two environmental restrictive scenarios. 
RWE has a good scope to increase its profits in the 10% reduction scenario, while the 
potential increase in profits is very low in the permit price scenario. A possible explana-
tion for this difference may be that RWE has still cheap alternative technologies avail-
able to increase its supply to the market in the 10% reduction scenario, while the permit 
price increases the cost of dirty technologies leading to a near dissipation of the payoff 
increase. 
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Table 6.9 Electricity prices and electricity supply during two types of emission  
constraints. 
 10% GHG reduction Fixed permit price 5€/ tonne GHG equiv. 
 REF COMP STACK STRA CROSS REF COMP STACK STRA CROSS
Price           
Average 20.62 18.00 26.42 26.17 25.87 20.62 18.82 26.56 28.25 26.35
Base 18.60 14.35 24.38 24.32 23.89 18.60 15.35 24.57 26.86 24.41
Peak 25.64 29.30 31.83 30.98 31.06 25.64 29.34 31.83 31.83 31.44
Demand           
Total 1423.0 1487.3 1245.6 1253.2 1256.8 1423.0 1462.0 1242.7 1212.4 1245.6 
Base 1014.0 1124.4 905.0 905.3 910.0 1014.0 1099.6 902.1 871.8 902.2 
Peak 409.0 362.8 340.6 347.9 346.8 409.0 362.4 340.5 340.5 343.4 
Utilization           
Total 67% 70% 60% 60% 60% 67% 69% 60% 58% 60%
Base 60% 66% 54% 54% 55% 60% 65% 54% 52% 54%
Peak 96% 85% 82% 84% 83% 96% 85% 82% 82% 83%
Emissions           
GHG eq 
(mt) 442.1 397.9 397.9 397.9 397.9 442.1 365.9 394.8 346.3 400.8 
permit price 0.00 2.16 4.62 1.77 2.16 0.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Reduction 0% 10% 10% 10% 10% 0% 17% 11% 22% 9%
Acid (10 kt) 107.8 97.5 99.7 98.7 99.0 107.8 88.5 99.0 85.5 101.7 
Pm10 (10 
kt) 287.1 261.1 261.6 254.7 256.3 287.1 235.7 259.8 214.0 266.9 
Payoffs           
Total 16,551 14,732 21,978 21,627 21,325 16,551 18,131 23,236 24,692 24,052
RWE 990 1,476 2,651 2,005 1,995 990 2,082 2,530 2,518 2,485
Note:  The average EU8 prices are the domestic market prices weighted by the share of  
 domestic supply in total EU8 supply. For RWE in the STACK scenario: ξbase = ξpeak = 0 
 in the 10% reduction scenario, while ξbase = 0 and ξpeak = 1 in the €5 permit price  
 scenario. 
6.7  Comparison  
We have carried out a sensitivity analysis in order to evaluate whether or not our find-
ings with the initial EMELIE model calibration are robust. Generally, we can argue that 
the model results are quite robust, although it is also clear from the sensitivity analysis 
that the results are not always straightforward. In particular, the EMELIE model is rather 
complex, and it includes many aspects of a liberalised electricity market, while conse-
quences of environmental policies can also be studied. For instance, national electricity 
markets will clear at different market price simulations even if the market would start off 
with uniform reference prices. Clearly, differences in and restrictions on production ca-
pacity, transmission capacity and environmental objectives contribute to different market 
clearing prices. When maximizing profits and acting strategically, electricity producers 
face different restrictions (environment, production capacity or transmission capacity) in 
different circumstances.  
The impact of transmission losses is rather straightforward. Higher transmission losses 
will increase the level of prices and reduce demand for electricity. The opposite devel-
opment holds for lower transmission losses. Table 6.10 summarises the scenarios.  
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Table 6.10 Summary of scenarios. 
Scenario Description   
Market price of electricity 
(€ per MWh) 
  ξ-base ξ-peak COMP STACK STRA CROSS
BAU Business as usual 0.439 0.000 17.14 24.22 25.07 24.55
LAMBDA Transmission losses +25% 0.443 0.771 17.47 24.83 25.73 25.22
 Transmission losses –25% 0.414 0.000 16.75 23.55 24.41 23.92
PEAKBASE Peak demand 80% production capacity 0.467 1.000 16.81 23.82 24.66 24.15
 Base price 80% average price 0.317 0.125 17.63 25.04 26.11 25.76
 Both effects 0.428 0.467 17.57 24.87 25.73 25.20
UNIFORM Uniform regional reference prices 0.075 0.130 16.55 25.23 25.98 25.36
ELASEQ Equal elasticity in both load periods 0.429 0.507 17.49 26.88 27.82 27.19
ELASTIC Elasticity +25% 0.000 0.056 17.44 22.16 23.06 22.88
 Elasticity –25% 0.435 0.250 16.77 28.25 29.14 28.05
TRANSM Reduced level of electricity transmission 0.470 1.000 16.55 25.23 25.98 25.36
 Unrestricted electricity transmission 0.329 0.134 18.25 22.94 23.99 23.82
ENVIRON GHG emissions –10% 0.000 0.000 18.00 26.42 26.17 25.87
 Permit price €5 per tonne GHG equiv. 0.000 1.000 18.82 26.56 28.25 26.35
 Average 0.303 0.389 17.37 25.00 25.86 25.26
 Variance 0.037 0.159 0.45 2.70 2.77 1.89
 
Table 6.10 shows the effect of the sensitivity analysis on the market power mark-ups and 
the prices in four behavioural scenarios. The market power mark-up in base load is 0.3 
with a relatively low variance, while the market power mark-up in the peak load is al-
most 0.4 with a relatively high variance. The variance in the price is also higher in the 
imperfect market behavioural scenarios (STACK, STRA, CROSS), but highest in the 
STRA scenario.  
The effect of the scenarios on the prices is quite varied. An increase in transmission 
losses leads to a moderate price increase in perfect and imperfect competition.  
While the price increase is in the same direction after lowering the reference price of 
base load, the price increase is relatively higher under imperfect competition. Uniform 
prices, however, decrease the prices under perfect competition, while it increases an-
tagonistically the prices under imperfect competition. The elasticity is clearly the most 
sensitive parameter of the model. Small variations in the elasticity can have large im-
pacts on the resulting market prices. Lowering the elasticity of peak demand to the level 
of elasticity of base demand leads to a mild price increase under perfect competition, due 
to the change in the demand curve, but a much higher price increase under imperfect 
competition. In addition, a uniform price decrease lowers the prices under perfect com-
petition, but increases the price under imperfect competition. Finally, the addition of en-
vironmental constraints leads to a substantial increase in production cost in both perfect 
and imperfect competition.  
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7. Conclusions 
The main research question in this report was is the following: What will happen to the 
wholesale price of electricity, the demand for electricity, the profits of firms, and finally 
the different kind of emissions under different types of producer behaviour? To answer 
this question this report started with a general discussion of the European electricity 
market, which is in the middle of a transformation process from a monopolistic state 
regulated market to a liberalised market where firms can compete with each other on 
various national markets and internationally.  
To study this complex change process, Chapter 2 presented and discussed data on the 
specific situation in the electricity market of eight European countries, namely Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. This data 
comprised the calibration of constant elasticity of substitution (consumer) demand 
curves for base and peak load periods of electricity, where peak load represents the 20% 
of hours with the highest hourly supply per year. In addition, data is presented on the 
transmission capacity among countries, while transmission within a country is assumed 
to be unlimited. Transmission losses between production and delivery of electricity 
among and within countries are also presented. There are at most 12 different technolo-
gies per country. At this level we presented installed capacity, variable costs, and emis-
sion factors of three pollutants, namely greenhouse gas, acidifying and fine particles 
emissions. Finally, the data on cross-border ownership relations among firms is pre-
sented as well. 
Chapter 3 presents and discusses the structure of the static EMELIE model and this 
shows how trade, capacity and environmental constraints are included into the model. 
Firm behaviour depends on the ability of firms to exercise market power, which again 
depends upon the market share, the elasticity of demand. A large firm has a large market 
share and a higher ability to increase prices by strategically choosing production. Passive 
cross-border ownership relations change the levels of market power among firms in the 
eight considered European markets. Chapter 4 summarizes the five scenarios of market 
structure.  
The base results with the model are presented in Chapter 5. This chapter discusses in 
length the type of results, which can be obtained with the model. The results consist of 
wholesale prices, firm’s payoffs, emissions and the use of technologies. In addition, 
wholesale prices are decomposed into the contribution of production, capacity usage and 
trade. It turns out that 2/3rd of the price is needed to cover production costs, while 1/3rd is 
needed to keep the capacity up and running. Only 3% of the price is needed for trade. In 
the case of imperfect competition the price of electricity is increased with the market 
power mark-up, which is a cap or profit margin on top of the marginal production costs, 
capacity payments and trade prices.  
The consequences of liberalisation for the environment are ambiguous. The exercise of 
market power can be beneficial for the environment. In the case where there are strategi-
cally acting firms (STRA), all environmental themes show a decline compared to the 
reference scenario. If RWE acts like a price fighter (STACK), the environment is worse 
off compared to the reference scenario. This is probably due to the rather dirty technolo-
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gies that RWE owns. In the case of full competition, greenhouse gases would decline, 
but acidification and smog formation would increase.  
To study the robustness of the model, a number of sensitivity analyses have been under-
taken with the model in Chapter 5. The overall effects were largely in the expected direc-
tion showing that the model is quite robust against perturbations. The details at the coun-
try level could, however, deviate from the overall pattern, showing that due to geo-
graphical differences, differences in production technologies and market structures, some 
country or countries do not follow the general trend. The elasticity as already discussed 
at various places in this report turns out to be the most sensitive parameter of the model. 
For instance, a low elasticity pushes down the maximum allowable market share to the 
elasticity value.  
In a liberalised market, large firms are most likely to behave strategically in order to 
make sufficient profits, creating an imperfect market. There are incentives for a single 
firm to become a market leader and to make a first move by setting its levels of produc-
tion. In case the followers do not change their reactions, they will reduce their supply in 
that market after obtaining information on this level of production. In that case there is a 
welfare transfer between the leader and the followers. The joined total payoff can in-
crease or decrease. 
Future simulations with the EMELIE model will consider various merger and demerger 
scenarios. It is for instance not a priori clear whether a merger will increase the joint 
profit of the merged firm, especially when there are many large firms in the market. An-
other interesting issue would be to simulate various leader-follower scenarios, next to 
our presumed leadership of RWE (Germany), so that we can study the potential changes 
in the market of this scenario.  
Two more extensions of the model are envisaged. Firstly, the EMELIE model will be-
come a dynamic model, so that long-term consequences of investment decisions on the 
liberalised electricity market can be assessed. It is particularly interesting to study the in-
vestment choices and price development over time with and without regulation for a 
number of future demand profiles. Secondly, instead of including a passive type of cross-
owners, it would be interesting to study active cross-border ownership relations. Then, 
firms own production capacity in different countries, and they can allocate their produc-
tion across these countries. Then, control over interconnection capacity can generate a 
new source of market power. In a process of market integration of the European electric-
ity market, this active ownership issue is much more realistic than the passive ownership. 
These are all promising fields for future research towards which we intend to use the 
EMELIE model. The current report has shown that the EMELIE model is a useful tool 
for policy analysis as the model is quite robust to perturbations.  
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